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Fielding congressional questioning during the financial crisis, former Federal 
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan expressed his “distress” in discovering a “flaw” 
in his free-market beliefs: “Those of us who have looked to the self-interest of 
lending institutions to protect shareholder’s equity (myself especially) are in a state 
of shocked disbelief.”1 The financial crisis has also prompted the jurist and famous 
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Chicago School theorist Richard A. Posner to reconsider some of his earlier 
beliefs.2 
Some say that the Chicago School’s economic theories—with their strong 
presumption of rational, self-interested profit maximizers with perfect willpower—
lost their luster within academic circles over twenty years ago with the rise of post-
Chicago School game theories. The post-Chicago School used rational actor 
models to challenge traditional Chicago predictions. Nonetheless, antitrust’s 
economic theories, whether derived from the Chicago,3 post-Chicago,4 or Harvard 
Schools,5 continue to assume rational self-interested market participants operate in 
the market with perfect willpower. 
This rationality assumption is under attack from several interdisciplinary 
economic fields, most notably behavioral economics. Behavioral economics, the 
management consulting firm McKinsey & Company recently observed, “is now 
mainstream.”6 Even before the financial crisis, behavioral economics was a hot 
topic. It is a staple in graduate economics programs, business schools, and 
increasingly in law schools.7 Recent best-selling books have featured behavioral 
economics, such as The Myth of the Rational Market,8 Animal Spirits,9 Predictably 
Irrational,10 and Nudge.11 Behavioral economics has also led to subspecialties in 
the areas of  
                                                                                                                 
 
 2. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND 
THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009); Marcus Baram, Judge Richard Posner Questions His 
Free-Market Faith in “A Failure of Capitalism,” HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 20, 2009,  
6:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/20/judge-richard-posner-disc_n_188950. 
html; John Cassidy, Interview with Richard Posner, NEW YORKER BLOG (Jan. 13,  
2010), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2010/01/interview-with-richard-
posner.html#ixzz0hJIhHeop (“The more informal economics of Keynes has made a big 
comeback because people realize that even though it is kind of loose . . . it seems to have 
more of a grasp of what is going on in the economy.”). 
 3. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH 
ITSELF (1978); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001).  
 4. See, e.g., 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 113, at 140 (3d ed. 2006) 
(“As a general proposition business firms are (or must be assumed to be) profit 
maximizers . . . .”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review & Critique, 2 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 258 (2001); Symposium, Post-Chicago Economics, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 
445 (1995). 
 5. See William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for 
Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 1 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 
(2007) (summarizing contributions of Harvard School to modern antitrust analysis). 
 6. Dan Lovallo & Olivier Sibony, The Case for Behavioral Strategy, MCKINSEY Q., 
Spring 2010, at 30, 30. 
 7. Law schools, such as the University of Tennessee, Yale, Harvard, and Georgetown, 
offer behavioral law and economics seminars. 
 8. JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD, 
AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET (2009). 
 9. GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN 
PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2009). 
 10. DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR 
DECISIONS (2008). 
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• subjective well-being and happiness;12  
• the media (including demand-driven media bias);13  
• marketing (including the paradox of choice);14  
• behavioral finance;15  
• criminal justice;16  
• sports;17 
• health care;18 
                                                                                                                 
 11. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
 12. See, e.g., RICHARD LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE 29–30 
(2005); Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, Some Uses of Happiness Data in Economics, 
20 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 26 (2006); Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, What Can Economists 
Learn from Happiness Research?, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 402 (2002); Daniel Kahneman & 
Alan B. Krueger, Developments in the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being, 20 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 3 (2006); Daniel Kahneman & Robert Sugden, Experienced Utility as a Standard of 
Policy Evaluation, 32 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 161 (2005); Daniel Kahneman, Alan B. 
Krueger, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz & Arthur A. Stone, Would You Be Happier If You 
Were Richer? A Focusing Illusion, 312 SCIENCE 1908, 1908–10 (2006); Richard Layard, 
Happiness and Public Policy: A Challenge to the Profession, 116 ECON. J. C24 (2006); 
George Loewenstein & Peter A. Ubel, Hedonic Adaptation and the Role of Decision and 
Experience Utility in Public Policy, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1795 (2008); Maurice E. Stucke, 
Money, Is That What I Want?: Competition Policy and the Role of Behavioral Economics, 50 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 893, 928–40 (2010).  
 13. See, e.g., Stefano DellaVigna & Ethan Kaplan, The Political Impact of Media Bias, 
in FACT FINDER, FACT FILTER: HOW MEDIA REPORTING AFFECTS PUBLIC POLICY (Roumeen 
Islam ed., forthcoming), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~sdellavi/wp/mediabiaswb07-
06-25.pdf; Matthew A. Baum & Tim Groeling, New Media and the Polarization of American 
Political Discourse, 25 POL. COMM. 345 (2008); Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, 
Competition and Truth in the Market for News, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 133 (2008); Matthew A. 
Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, Media, Education and Anti-Americanism in the Muslim 
World, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 117 (2004); Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, What Drives 
Media Slant? Evidence from U.S. Daily Newspapers, 78 ECONOMETRICA 35 (2010); Charles 
S. Taber & Milton Lodge, Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs, 50 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 755 (2006).  
 14. See, e.g., BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS (2004); 
Simona Botti & Sheena S. Iyengar, The Dark Side of Choice: When Choice Impairs Social 
Welfare, 25 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 24 (2006). As for the implications of the paradox of 
choice on the poor, see Marianne Bertrand, Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, Behavioral 
Economics and Marketing in Aid of Decision Making Among the Poor, 25 J. PUB. POL’Y & 
MARKETING 8, 12 (2006). 
 15. See, e.g., 2 ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Richard H. Thaler ed., 2005); 
ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2d ed. 2005). 
 16. See, e.g., Birte Englich, Thomas Mussweiler & Fritz Strack, Playing Dice with 
Criminal Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts’ Judicial Decision 
Making, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 188 (2006); Richard H. McAdams & 
Thomas S. Ulen, Behavioral Criminal Law and Economics (John M. Olin Law & Econ., 
Working Paper No. 440, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1299963. 
 17. See, e.g., Devin G. Pope & Maurice E. Schweitzer, Is Tiger Woods Loss Averse? 
Persistent Bias in the Face of Experience, Competition, and High Stakes, 101 AM. ECON. 
REV. 129 (2011). 
 18. See, e.g., Thomas L. Greaney, Economic Regulation of Physicians: A Behavioral 
Economics Perspective, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1189 (2009). 
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• behavioral political economy;19  
• behavioral institutional design;20  
• behavioral labor economics;21 and  
• behavioral industrial organization.22 
The financial crisis raised important issues of market failure, weak regulation, 
moral hazard, and our lack of understanding about how many markets actually 
operate. The crisis has also prompted policy makers in the United States to 
reexamine the assumptions underlying the prevailing neoclassical economic 
theories.23 Competition authorities in the European Commission,24 the United 
Kingdom’s Office of Fair Trading,25 and the United States26 are interested in 
behavioral economics. The American Antitrust Institute (AAI)27 and antitrust 
                                                                                                                 
 
 19. Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 315, 364 (2009). 
 20. Id. at 364–65. 
 21. Id. at 362–63. 
 22. Id. at 361–62. 
 23. See John Authers, Wanted: New Model for Markets, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at 9. 
 24. See Eliana Garcés, The Impact of Behavioral Economics on Consumer and 
Competition Policies, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 145 (2010); Press Release, European 
Union Comm’n for Consumers, Why Consumers Behave the Way They Do: Commissioner 
Kuneva Hosts High Level Conference on Behavioural Economics (Nov. 28, 2008), available 
at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1836&format=HTML& 
aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
 25. See, e.g., OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING (U.K.), THE IMPACT OF PRICE FRAMES ON 
CONSUMER DECISION MAKING (2010), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/ 
economic_research/OFT1226.pdf; Matthew Bennett, John Fingleton, Amelia Fletcher, Liz 
Hurley & David Ruck, What Does Behavioral Economics Mean for Competition Policy?, 6 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 111, 118 (2010); Amelia Fletcher, Chief Economist, Office of 
Fair Trading (U.K.), What Do Policy-Makers Need from Behavioural Economists?, Address 
at the European Commission Consumer Affairs Conference (Nov. 28, 2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/dyna/conference/programme_en.htm.  
 26. Commissioner Rosch of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), for example, has 
been interested in the implications of behavioral economics for competition policy. See J. 
Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Behavioral Economics: Observations 
Regarding Issues that Lie Ahead, Remarks at the Vienna Competition Conference (June 9, 
2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/100609viennaremarks.pdf; J. Thomas 
Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Managing Irrationality: Some Observations on 
Behavioral Economics and the Creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency, 
Remarks at the Conference on the Regulation of Consumer Financial Products (Jan. 6, 2010) 
[hereinafter Rosch, Managing Irrationality], available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/ 
rosch/100106financial-products.pdf. Likewise, Carl Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General in the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, and Joe Farrell, Director of the 
FTC’s Bureau of Economics, recently acknowledged that behavioral economics may offer 
insights relevant to antitrust and consumer protection analysis. See Roundtable Interview 
with Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb. 2010, at 1, 7–8. 
 27. 9th Annual Conference: The Next Antitrust Agenda, AMERICAN ANTITRUST 
INSTITUTE (June 18, 2008), http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/content/9th-annual-conference-
next-antitrust-agenda (audio recordings from the conference); see also AM. ANTITRUST INST., 
THE NEXT ANTITRUST AGENDA: THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE’S TRANSITION REPORT 
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scholars28 are discussing the applicability of behavioral economics to competition 
policy. Soon, enterprising antitrust lawyers may raise behavioral economics 
findings in white papers to the agencies or in federal court pleadings. In fact, the 
literature on behavioral economics was recently raised before the U.S. Supreme 
Court,29 in a case where two Chicago School theorists (Judges Posner and 
Easterbrook) disagreed on the mutual fund industry’s efficiency.30 
The immediate question is to what extent the irrational conduct that behavioral 
economics identifies should have implications for evaluating whether conduct is 
anticompetitive. The Chicago School’s neoclassical economic theories teach that 
irrationality is irrelevant to antitrust doctrine: rational firms eliminate irrationality 
from the marketplace. After the financial crisis, however, one cannot assume that 
markets operate as efficiently as the Chicago School predicts. Antitrust policy 
makers must inquire what role behavioral economics can play in the agencies’ 
enforcement of the federal antitrust laws.31 
This Article addresses the implications of the increasing interest in behavioral 
economics for competition policy. Part I provides an overview of behavioral 
economics. Part II discusses how the assumption of rational, self-interested profit 
maximizers became so embedded in antitrust policy. Part III discusses to what 
extent the behavioral economics literature can inform antitrust policies and cause 
lawmakers to question their neoclassically based assumptions. Part IV offers 
several recommendations related to the practical application of behavioral 
economics to antitrust law going forward. 
                                                                                                                 
ON COMPETITION POLICY TO THE 44TH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 26, 172, 185, 200–
01, 272–75 (2008) (recommending more empirical analysis to further antitrust policies 
involving cartels, mergers, and media industries). The British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law has also shown an interest in behavioral economics. See BRITISH INST. OF 
INT’L AND COMPARATIVE LAW, http://www.biicl.org/clf/clfmeetings2009 (hosting a 
Competition Law Forum on behavioral economics in July 2009). 
 28. At the Next Generation of Antitrust Scholarship Conference held at the New York 
University School of Law in January 2010, several authors applied behavioral economics to 
antitrust policy. See Maurice E. Stucke, Am I a Price-Fixer? A Behavioral Economics 
Analysis of Cartels, in CRIMINALISING CARTELS: A CRITICAL INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF 
AN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY MOVEMENT (Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi eds., 
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1535720; Max Huffman, Behavioral 
Exploitation and Antitrust (Jan. 29, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www3.luc.edu/law/academics/special/center/antitrust/colloquium/pdfs/huffman_exploi
tation.pdf; Avishalom Tor & William J. Rinner, Behavioral Antitrust: A New Approach to 
the Rule of Reason After Leegin (Dec. 1, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1522948. 
 29. Brief for Robert Litan et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Jones v. Harris 
Assocs., 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010) (No. 08–856). 
 30. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc denied, 537 
F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2008). The Court ultimately eschewed the issue, holding that the debate 
between Judges Easterbrook and Posner was “a matter for Congress, not the courts.” Jones v. 
Harris Assocs., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1431 (2010). 
 31. For purposes of this Article, the relevant laws are sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006), and section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). 
1532 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:1527 
 
I. OVERVIEW OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 
A. What Is Behavioral Economics? 
Neoclassical economic theory assumes that humans are rational, self-interested 
beings with perfect willpower. In making determinations under their Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice’s 
Antitrust Division, for example, assume that actual behavior comports with 
rational, self-interested (i.e., profit-maximizing) behavior.32 In conduct cases, the 
U.S. federal courts dismiss complaints or grant summary judgment if antitrust 
plaintiffs’ theories do not make “economic sense,” such as alleging economically 
irrational behavior.33  
Behavioral economics uses methods from neuroscience and social sciences, 
such as psychology and sociology, to understand the limits of this assumption.34 
Testing this rationality assumption through experiments,35 behavioral economists 
find that people systematically and predictably do not behave in certain scenarios as 
neoclassical economic theory predicts.36 Instead, behavioral economics 
characterizes human behavior as defined by three traits: bounded rationality, 
bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest. 
1. Bounded Rationality 
In theory, rational agents seek out the optimal amount of information, and 
readily and continually update their prior factual beliefs with relevant and reliable 
empirical data. It is similar to a treasure hunt: as we receive new factual clues along 
the way, we revise our beliefs and modify our behavior. In contrast, bounded 
rationality acknowledges the distinction between reasoning versus intuition.37 
Consumers are not perfectly objective and rational Bayesians, who readily update 
                                                                                                                 
 
 32. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 
§ 1 (2010) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES] (“In evaluating how a merger will 
likely change a firm’s behavior, the Agencies focus primarily on how the merger affects 
conduct that would be most profitable for the firm.”). 
 33. Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 316 
(2010); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (requiring a plaintiff 
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”). 
 34. For interesting surveys of the behavioral economics research, see generally 
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (Colin F. Camerer, George Loewenstein & Matthew 
Rabin eds., 2004); MORAL SENTIMENTS AND MATERIAL INTERESTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE (Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd & Ernst Fehr 
eds., 2005); DellaVigna, supra note 19; Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, 
A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1487 (1998). 
 35. See Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein, Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, 
Future, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 34, at 7; DellaVigna, supra 
note 19.  
 36. See Avishalom Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 4 HAIFA L. 
REV. 237, 242–43 (2008). 
 37. Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral 
Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1451 (2003). 
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prior factual beliefs whenever appraised of reliable information.38 Instead, while we 
may maintain an illusion of objectivity, our goals can bias our beliefs about 
everything from our perception of ourselves, other people, and events, to the value 
of goods or services, to our evaluation of scientific evidence—much like the goals 
of a prosecutor seeking to convince the court of the defendant’s guilt.39 As a result, 
we access only a subset of our relevant knowledge and give undue weight to 
evidence that supports our beliefs, while discounting evidence that undercuts our 
beliefs.  
In one experiment, the subjects received the same twenty-seven pages of 
evidentiary materials from an actual Texas lawsuit filed by an injured motorcyclist 
against the driver of the automobile that collided with him.40 Subjects were 
randomly assigned the role of plaintiff or defendant. After reading the case 
materials, they predicted what the judge had awarded and what a “fair” settlement 
would be. Participants playing the plaintiff predicted a significantly larger award by 
the judge (on average $14,527 higher than defendants’ prediction). The plaintiffs 
and defendants each recalled more arguments favoring their side, and weighed the 
arguments favoring their side more heavily. In a later experiment, the subjects first 
read the case materials and offered their estimates of the judge’s award and a fair 
settlement. Only then were they told of their role as plaintiff or defendant. Those 
who learned their roles after they offered estimates had closer estimates of the 
likely award, and were significantly more likely to settle. 
Another key insight of bounded rationality is that humans rely on rules of thumb 
(heuristics) in making decisions, and engage in a couple of steps of iterated 
reasoning. For example, framing effects (the way the choice is framed, such as a 
sure gain or avoiding a loss) can alter the way we decide.41 In one experiment, 
individuals could choose either an eighty percent chance of winning $4000 or 
$3000 guaranteed.42 Rational profit maximizers should opt for the greater 
discounted value—the eighty percent chance ($3200); yet most people (eighty 
                                                                                                                 
 
 38. See Bayesian, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/bayesian (defining Bayesian as “being, relating to, or involving statistical methods 
that assign probabilities or distributions to events (as rain tomorrow) or parameters (as a 
population mean) based on experience or best guesses before experimentation and data 
collection and that apply Bayes’ theorem to revise the probabilities and distributions after 
obtaining experimental data”). 
 39. Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 482–95 
(1990). 
 40. Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role 
of Self-Serving Biases, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 34, at 328.  
 41. Under the Asian Disease hypothetical, 600 people are expected to die. The majority 
choose Program A, saving a sum certain number of lives (200 people), versus Program B, 
which offers a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved (and a two-thirds 
probability that no one will be saved). Yet a substantial majority did not choose Program A 
when it presented a sum certain number of deaths (400) versus Program B (a one-third 
probability that 600 people will be saved (no deaths) and a two-thirds probability that 600 
people will die). Kahneman, supra note 37, at 1458. 
 42. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 268 (1979). 
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percent surveyed) were risk adverse and opted for $3000.43 But when they stood to 
lose either $3000 versus an eighty percent chance of losing $4000, many became 
risk seeking and opted for the latter.44 Moreover, losses closer to a reference point 
hurt more than the joy from comparable gains.45 Bounded rationality encompasses 
other anomalies in human decision making, including: 
• the endowment effect—when we demand much more to give 
up and sell an object than what we would be willing to pay to 
acquire that object;46 
• status quo bias—when the choice of default option impacts the 
outcome;47 
• anchoring effects—how a randomly chosen standard may 
subsequently influence a judgment on the same task;48  
• availability heuristic—when we assess the probability of an 
event by asking whether relevant examples come readily to 
mind;49  
• representative heuristic—when we ignore the “base rates and 
overestimate the correlation between what something appears 
to be and what something actually is”;50  
• overconfidence bias—where, for example, executives in 
several behavioral studies were overconfident in their ability to 
manage a company, systematically underestimated their 
competitors’ strength, and were prone to self-serving 
interpretations of reality (such as taking credit for positive 
outcomes, and blaming the environment for negative 
outcomes);51 
                                                                                                                 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Kahneman, supra note 37, at 1456.  
 46. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES 
OF ECONOMIC LIFE 63 (1992); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, 
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 
1327 tbl.1 (1990) (summarizing evaluation disparity studies); Jolls et al., supra note 34, at 
1482, 1484, 1498. 
 47. See, e.g., THALER, supra note 46, at 68–70. 
 48. One series of experiments is to establish an arbitrary initial price (such as the last 
two digits of one’s social security number) in the test subjects’ minds. While that initial price 
is arbitrary, once it is established in their minds, it shapes what the subjects are willing to 
pay for that item and related items. ARIELY, supra note 10, at 25–28; see also Englich et al., 
supra note 16 (describing how sentencing anchors can influence judges and prosecutors). 
 49. See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Market Efficiency and Rationality: 
The Peculiar Case of Baseball, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1390, 1395–96 (2004) (book review) 
(noting a study that found that individuals are more likely to think that more words on a 
random page end with “-ing” than have the letter “n” as their next to last letter); Kahneman, 
supra note 37, at 1466–67 (people estimating twice the number of murders in Detroit versus 
the state of Michigan).  
 50. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1086 (2000) (citing 
Tversky and Kahneman’s bank teller problem); see Kahneman, supra note 37, at 1462. 
 51. Cristoph Engel, The Behaviour of Corporate Actors: How Much Can We Learn from 
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• optimistic bias—when we believe that good things are more 
likely (and bad things less likely) than average to happen to 
us;52 and 
• hindsight bias—our tendency to increase the likelihood of an 
event’s occurrence after learning that it actually did occur.53 
2. Bounded Willpower 
Willpower refers to the notion of self-control: when we know something is bad 
for us, we avoid it. Bounded willpower, in contrast, refers to when we knowingly 
engage in actions known to be detrimental and therefore act contrary to our long-
term interests.54 As anyone who has ever overeaten, overspent, or otherwise 
succumbed to temptation (despite having the best intentions not to do so) can 
confirm, many people are not very good at predicting their willpower. 
Recent neurological research has examined to what extent the discrepancy 
between short-run and long-run human preferences reflects the activation of 
different parts of the brain’s neural system.55 This research suggests that choices 
that involve an immediate reward can disproportionately activate the impulsive part 
of the brain (the limbic system) rather than the more deliberative part of the brain 
that engages in long-term cost-benefit analyses (the lateral prefrontal cortex).56 At a 
practical level, these insights suggest that, in situations that involve a short-term 
gain even at a long-term cost, we may not engage in the cost-benefit analysis 
expected under rational choice theory.  
Thus, recognizing our bounded willpower, we at times seek commitment 
devices. We opt for automatic payroll deductions into 401(k) retirement plans, 
certificates of deposit, or other plans with liquidity restrictions to constrain our 
immediate consumption.57 We may place the alarm clock further away, not shop 
                                                                                                                 
the Experimental Literature?, 6 J. INST. ECON. 445, 446 (2010); see also DellaVigna, supra 
note 19, at 317, 342–43 (discussing field experiments). 
 52. See, e.g., Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein, Resistance of Personal Risk 
Perceptions to Debiasing Interventions, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 313 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002). 
 53. See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 50, at 1095–1100. 
 54. See Jolls et al., supra note 34, at 1480. 
 55. Samuel M. McClure, David I. Laibson, George Loewenstein & Jonathan D. Cohen, 
Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate and Delayed Monetary Rewards, 306 SCIENCE 
503, 503–07 (2004).  
 56. See id. at 506 (showing that choices involving an immediate outcome 
disproportionately activated the limbic system and that, in contrast, when participants chose 
a long-run option, the lateral prefrontal cortex was significantly more active than the limbic 
system). 
 57. For the effectiveness of changing the default option to automatic enrollment in 
retirement accounts, see generally Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More 
Tomorrow™: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON. 
S164 (2004); Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 
401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149 (2001); John Beshears, 
James J. Choi, David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian, The Importance of Default Options for 
Retirement Savings Outcomes: Evidence from the United States, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 12009, Jan. 2006), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12009.  
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when we are hungry, or set our watch slightly ahead of time. These commitment 
devices—while a rational response to our bounded willpower—can lead us to 
“overcorrect” for our bounded willpower.58 We may pay more for less of what we 
like too much (such as buying cigarettes individually or by the pack, rather than by 
the carton). And, more generally, we may behave in ways contrary to the tenets of 
wealth maximization (such as giving the U.S. government an interest-free loan by 
withholding too much taxes from our paycheck to ensure a return at tax time). 
3. Bounded Self-Interest 
Self-interest means people seek to maximize their wealth and other material 
goals, and generally do not care about other social goals to the extent they conflict 
with personal wealth maximization. Bounded self-interest, as behavioral 
experiments confirm, means that human motivation is more nuanced and complex 
than this simplistic assumption of self-interest.59 
Psychological and experimental economic evidence shows that people care 
about treating others, and being treated, fairly.60 Recent experiments in bargaining 
settings, for example, systematically show “that substantial fractions of most 
populations adhere to moral rules, willingly give to others, and punish those who 
offend standards of appropriate behavior, even at a cost to themselves and with no 
expectation of material reward.”61 This “strong reciprocity” in human behavior, 
however, also entails “a predisposition . . . to punish [at personal cost] those who 
violate the norms of cooperation . . . even when it is implausible to expect that 
these costs will be repaid.”62 Similarly, behavioral experiments suggest that many 
people do not free ride at all (or to the extent that rational choice theory predicts). 
In these public goods experiments, “people have a tendency to cooperate until 
experience shows that those with whom they’re interacting are taking advantage of 
them.”63 Consequently, individuals at times act benevolently even when it is not in 
their financial interest (such as tipping waiters and waitresses in cities they are 
unlikely to revisit) and will sacrifice monetary gains to punish those they feel are 
                                                                                                                 
 
 58. See Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 
103, 111–12 (1999) (discussing how sophisticated individuals recognize their bounded 
willpower and thus “are more inclined than naifs to do [tasks] now, irrespective of whether it 
is costs, rewards, or both that are immediate”). 
 59. See Stucke, supra note 12, at 909.  
 60. See Jolls et al., supra note 34, at 1479. 
 61. Samuel Bowles, Policies Designed for Self-Interested Citizens May Undermine 
“The Moral Sentiments”: Evidence from Economic Experiments, 320 SCIENCE 1605, 1606 
(2008). 
 62. Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd & Ernest Fehr, Explaining Altruistic 
Behavior in Humans, 24 EVOLUTION & HUMAN BEHAV. 153, 153–54 (2003) (arguing further 
that “the evolutionary success of our species and the moral sentiments that have led people 
to value freedom, equality, and representative government are predicated upon strong 
reciprocity and related motivations that go beyond inclusive fitness and reciprocal 
altruism”).  
 63. THALER, supra note 46, at 14. 
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acting unfairly, such as by deviating from an established reference point of 
“fairness.”  
One frequently cited experiment of negative reciprocal behavior and bounded 
self-interest is the “Ultimatum Game,” where a subject is given some money and 
must offer a second subject some portion thereof.64 If the second subject accepts the 
offer, both can keep the money. If the second subject rejects the offer, neither keeps 
the money. Neoclassical economic theory predicts people will offer the smallest 
amount—one penny. If everyone pursues their self-interest, the first subject would 
selfishly want as much money as possible; the second subject recognizes that a 
penny is better than nothing. 
But actual experiments of this Ultimatum Game in over twenty countries show 
the contrary. In expanding the Ultimatum Game experiment to fifteen small-scale 
economies from twelve countries on four continents,65 participants reciprocated and 
did not offer the nominal amount. Nor did high financial stakes eliminate this 
bounded self-interest.66 Most offered significantly more than the nominal amount 
(ordinarily forty to fifty percent of the total amount available), and recipients 
rejected nominal amounts (less than twenty percent of the total amount available) 
about half the time.67 Consequently, most receivers in this game forgo wealth to 
punish unfair offers, and offerors generally offer more than the nominal profit-
maximizing amount.68 Wealth may still be relevant to offerors, but unlike the self-
interested profit maximizer, offerors recognize the need for a sense of fairness and 
equity to maximize their return.  
Similarly, one recent study found that informal religious norms can play an 
important role in supporting a competitive market economy.69 The study measured 
the individuals’ propensities for fairness and willingness to punish unfairness. The 
study involved fifteen populations that vary in their degree of market integration 
and their participation in a world religion (such as Islam or Christianity).70 The 
financial stakes in the behavioral experiments were set at one day’s local wages.71 
                                                                                                                 
 
 64. See HERBERT GINTIS, THE BOUNDS OF REASON: GAME THEORY AND THE UNIFICATION 
OF THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 49, 57–58 (2009) (discussing results of Ultimatum Game); 
Werner Güth, Rolf Schmittberger & Bernd Schwarze, An Experimental Analysis of 
Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367, 367 (1982). 
 65. Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert 
Gintis & Richard McElreath, In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 
Small-Scale Societies, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 73 (2001).  
 66. See, e.g., id. at 74 (using equivalent of a day or two’s wages for amount divided in 
experiment). 
 67. Gintis et al., supra note 62, at 157; Henrich et al., supra note 65, at 75 (noting that in 
industrial societies, offers below twenty percent are rejected with a probability of 0.40 to 
0.60); Jolls et al., supra note 34, at 1490. 
 68. Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-First 
Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 529–30 (2007). 
 69. Joseph Henrich, Jean Ensminger, Richard McElreath, Abigail Barr, Clark Barrett, 
Alexander Bolyanatz, Juan Camilo Cardenas, Michael Gurven, Edwins Gwako, Natalie 
Henrich, Carolyn Lesorogol, Frank Marlowe, David Tracer & John Ziker, Markets, Religion, 
Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment, 327 SCIENCE 1480 (2010).  
 70. Id. at 1480. 
 71. Id. at 1482. 
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The results reflected a stark contrast between nomadic, nonintegrated, fully 
subsistence societies with local religions (such as the Hadza population from 
Tanzania) and fully market-incorporated societies with worldwide religions (such 
as the residents of Missouri, United States, and Accra City, Ghana).72 The study 
found that as market integration increases (as measured by the percentage of 
purchased calories in diet), the people become more generous (sharing more of the 
day’s wages with the other player in the Dictator Game).73 Likewise, as a society’s 
participation in Islam or Christianity increases, so does the sharing in these 
behavioral experiments increase.74 
Aside from reciprocity, individuals at times act from an intrinsic motivation, 
independent of any financial reward. Indeed, financial rewards can decrease (rather 
than increase) motivation or the likelihood of the desired results.75 Likewise, 
financial disincentives may not be as effective as social or ethical norms in curbing 
unwanted behavior.76 
B. Some Criticisms and Shortcomings of Behavioral Economics,  
and Responses to Those Criticisms 
Some observers are skeptical of the usefulness of behavioral economics. They 
view it as merely amusing and argue that it is inapplicable to individual (or firm) 
behavior in the marketplace.  
1. Representativeness 
One criticism is that behavioral economics experiments focus on certain persons 
not representative of the total population (namely university students) in an 
artificial setting (namely lab experiments).77 So naturally, students’ decisions in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 72. Id. at 1483–84. 
 73. Id. at 1483 fig.1. In the Dictator Game, two anonymous players were allotted a sum 
of money in a one-shot interaction. Player 1 had to decide how to divide this sum between 
himself or herself and Player 2. Player 2 received the allocation (offer), and the game ended. 
Id. at 1481. 
 74. Id. at 1482. 
 75. In one study, for example, high school students collected donations for a public 
purpose in Israel’s annually publicized “donation days.” One group of students received a 
pep talk about the importance of these donations. A second group, in addition to the pep talk, 
was promised one percent of the amount collected (to be paid from an independent source). 
A third group was promised ten percent of the amount collected. Under rational choice 
theory, the third group, motivated by the greater financial incentive, should collect the most 
donations. Instead, the groups promised the one percent and ten percent shares collected a 
lower average amount ($153.67 and $219.33, respectively) than the group given only the pep 
talk ($238.60). Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Incentives, Punishment, and Behavior, in 
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 34, at 578–80. 
 76. See id. at 581–86. 
 77. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 
50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1566 (1998). 
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experimental games with small financial stakes could differ from real market 
behavior with often-greater financial stakes.78 
But behavioral lab experiments enable researchers to isolate variables and 
examine how behavior correlates with each variable (although one criticism from 
noneconomists is that these experiments are an elaborate and costly way of telling 
us what we already know). Moreover, today’s behavioral economics literature 
includes field experiments and data from actual market transactions.79 Not 
surprisingly, marketing companies are devoting resources on behavioral 
experiments and neuroscience to learn more about consumers’ behavior decisions.80 
2. Firm v. Individual Behavior 
A second criticism is that the insights from behavioral economics about 
individual behavior are not helpful in predicting firm behavior in competitive 
markets.81 Market participants typically are repeat players who learn from and 
correct their mistakes. Firms and their employees have greater incentives to 
rationally profit maximize, as they often are subject to competitive pressures.82 
Many firms benefit from the division of labor, and accordingly train or hire experts 
to capture the benefits from specialized knowledge. Irrational participants 
eventually exit the market. Thus, as Posner opines, “unusually ‘fair’ ”  people will 
avoid or be forced out of “roughhouse activities—including highly competitive 
businesses, trial lawyering, and the academic rat race.”83 For several reasons, these 
criticisms are misplaced. 
First, neoclassical economists often use the stock market as the example that 
most closely approximates perfect competition.84 But how many people after the 
financial crisis still have faith in the efficient market hypothesis, which posits that 
stock prices reflect their fundamental value (the discounted sum of expected future 
                                                                                                                 
 
 78. At times, the behavior of university students is closer to rational choice theory. For 
example, university students are more likely than non-students to give nothing in dictator 
games. See Christoph Engel, Dictator Games: A Meta Study 13 (Jan. 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1568732. 
 79. For one recent survey of the literature, see DellaVigna, supra note 19, at 320–65. 
For a recent integration of field and lab experiments, see Devesh Rustagi, Stefanie Engel & 
Michael Kosfeld, Conditional Cooperation and Costly Monitoring Explain Success in Forest 
Commons Management, 330 SCIENCE 961, 961–64 (2010).  
 80. Stuart Elliott, A Quest to Learn What Drives Consumer Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, June 
30, 2010, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/30/business/media/ 
30adco.html. 
 81. See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright & Judd E. Stone II, Misbehavioral Economics: The Case 
Against Behavioral Antitrust 9 (Oct. 2, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1686389 (“First, while firms may be, at their core, self-selected 
aggregations of individuals, it does not follow that firms necessarily behave with similar, or 
similarly predictable, consequences.”). 
 82. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 
140–41, 144–46 (2006) (arguing that consumers outside the lab have stronger incentives to 
reduce error, which they are able to do through experience). 
 83. Posner, supra note 77, at 1570. 
 84. POSNER, supra note 3, at 164. 
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cash flow)? The behavioral finance literature questions the degree of efficiency in 
the stock market and addresses the limits of arbitrage.85 Consequently, if 
irrationality is not driven out of supposedly perfectly competitive markets, why 
should we assume that irrationality is driven out in less efficient markets? 
Accordingly, the assumption that bounded rational consumers magically transform 
themselves individually or collectively into rational, far-sighted, strategic 
maximizers with perfect willpower upon entering the workplace is empirically 
suspect. 
Indeed, there is evidence that firms as institutions may depart from rationality, 
although at times in different ways and degrees than individuals do. People can 
behave differently depending on situational factors, such as being alone or in 
groups.86 Groups, at times, can minimize individual biases, but at other times (such 
as cults, mobs, and “groupthink”87) groups can displace independent thinking. Firm 
behavior itself can vary, as firms vary by purpose (nonprofit versus profit); 
structure (partnership, family concern, conglomerate); national identity and cultural 
norms (local firm, multinational); regulatory environment (utility versus 
unregulated concern); and size (large versus small). 
Take, for example, the United States’ antitrust challenge of MIT and eight Ivy 
League universities.88 For years the universities collectively determined the amount 
of financial aid for prospective students admitted to two or more of their 
universities. MIT on appeal raised an interesting argument. In a perfectly 
competitive market, price equals marginal cost, and no rational profit-maximizing 
firm (outside of a predatory pricing scheme) would price below marginal cost. MIT 
priced its discounted tuition to needy students at substantially below its marginal 
cost of providing education for one year. Because profit-maximizing companies 
would not engage in such “economically abnormal” behavior, MIT argued, its 
activity must be noncommercial.89 The Third Circuit rejected MIT’s argument,90 
but it implicitly accepted that firms do not always behave as rational profit 
maximizers.91 
                                                                                                                 
 
 85. See, e.g., ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000); 1 ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Richard H. Thaler ed., 
1993); see also Diana B. Henriques, Odd Crop Prices Defy Economics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
28, 2008, at C1 (noting how on dozens of occasions since early 2006 futures contracts for 
corn, wheat, and soybeans have expired at a price much higher than the day’s cash price for 
those grains). 
 86. See generally PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD 
PEOPLE TURN EVIL (2008). 
 87. See Robert S. Baron, So Right It’s Wrong: Groupthink and the Ubiquitous Nature of 
Polarized Group Decision Making, in 37 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
219 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 2005). 
 88. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 89. Id. at 666. 
 90. The court noted that MIT’s full tuition figure was also significantly below its 
marginal cost. So “whether the price charged for educational services is below marginal cost 
is not probative of the commercial or noncommercial nature of the methodology utilized to 
determine financial aid packages.” Id. 
 91. Id. at 672, 672 n.9 (discussing MIT’s “pure altruistic motive,” and noting that MIT 
“could fill its class each year with affluent students who do not need financial assistance”). 
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One explanation as to why firms behave irrationally is that firms cannot always 
monitor and deter bounded rational employees from acting contrary to the firms’ 
long-term interests. As discussed above, “CEOs may be overly optimistic about the 
profitability of mergers or other actions they undertake,” and “managers might face 
incentives which induce them to care about relative rather than absolute profits.”92 
Similarly, when executives conspire to fix prices, they are not always acting with 
their firms’ knowledge or at their behest. 
Second, bounded rationality, willpower, and self-interest can affect competition 
through the individual behavior of the millions of atomistic self-employed workers 
who supply their services or products into the supply chain.93 This group includes 
self-employed farmers, ranchers, fishermen, freelance writers, doctors, lawyers, and 
architects. These individuals can behave contrary to rational choice theory.94 
Third, bounded rationality, willpower, and self-interest can affect competition 
through the individual behavior of the hundreds of millions of consumers. 
Individuals in the United States spend trillions of dollars annually on goods and 
services ($3.201 trillion in purchases on credit, debit, and prepaid cards in 2009),95 
so their bounded rational behavior can affect competition in many markets. Even if 
firms were relatively more rational than consumers, behavioral economics is 
relevant in understanding consumer decision making and how firms compete to 
help or exploit these bounded rational consumers. 
One staple of antitrust policy is predicting how consumers would respond to 
firms raising the price of their goods or services by a small but significant 
nontransitory amount. Price frames, under rational choice theory, should not affect 
the consumers’ decision. But the United Kingdom’s Office of Fair Trading (OFT) 
recently studied how firms can use price frames to exploit bounded rational 
consumers.96 The OFT’s behavioral experiment found that consumers deviated 
from rational choice theory in the following five price frames: (i) “drip pricing,” 
where a lower price is initially disclosed to the consumer and additional charges are 
added as the sale progresses; (ii) “sales,” where the “sales” price is referenced off 
                                                                                                                 
 
 92. Mark Armstrong & Steffen Huck, Behavioral Economics as Applied to Firms: A 
Primer, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 3, 4 (2010); see supra text accompanying note 51. 
 93. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HOUSEHOLD DATA ANNUAL AVERAGES—TABLE 
12: EMPLOYED PERSONS BY SEX, OCCUPATION, CLASS OF WORKER, FULL- OR PART-TIME 
STATUS, AND RACE (2010), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat12.pdf (reporting 
8.995 million self-employed non-agricultural workers and 836,000 self-employed 
agricultural workers in the United States in 2009). 
 94. See Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The 
Role of Self-Serving Biases, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 34, at 326, 
333 (public school teachers); Colin F. Camerer, Linda Babcock, George Lowenstein & 
Richard H. Thaler, Labor Supply of New York City Cab Drivers: One Day at a Time, in 
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 34, at 533 (questioning the intertemporal 
substitution hypothesis that taxi drivers will work longer hours on high wage days); Colin F. 
Camerer, Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field, in ADVANCES IN 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 34, at 148, 149; Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Pär Anders 
Granhag, Maria Hartwig & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to 
Predict Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133 (2010). 
 95. Card Debt Per U.S. Household, NILSON REPORT, May 2010, at 1, 9. 
 96. See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 25. 
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an inflated regular price (was $2, now $1); (iii) “complex pricing,” such as three-
for-two offers, where the unit price requires some computation; (iv) “baiting,” 
where sellers promote a special deal, but offer only a limited number of goods at 
that price; and (v) “time limited offers,” where the special price is available for a 
short period. Consumers made more mistakes and were especially worse off under 
drip pricing and time-limited offers. Thus, one application of behavioral economics 
to antitrust is to model consumer behavior and consider the effect of this behavior 
on competition. 
As these observations suggest, the question is not whether firms and consumers 
are equally irrational, but the degree and type of biases and heuristics that different 
firms display. Not surprisingly, there is already a wide body of research on this 
topic in the business literature. That literature discusses the substantial variation in 
the ways corporations learn (such as the routines and forms of organizational 
structure they use).97 The empirical and theoretical work on organizational learning 
rests on bounded rationality and offers several insights about how firms engage in 
different forms of intrafirm conduct to overcome their bounded rationality and to 
compete more effectively with other firms.98 Among the literature’s insights:  
• firms that better implement and update their learning (such as 
through routines) can better collect and exploit their 
knowledge, yield greater productive efficiencies, and enjoy a 
competitive advantage;99  
• firms may improve feedback mechanisms, whereby employees 
can learn from their mistakes and improve their reasoning and 
willpower;100 
• firms can promote different social, ethical, and moral values 
that affect firm behavior,101 and therefore reduce their 
                                                                                                                 
 
 97. See, e.g., Lovallo & Sibony, supra note 6, at 3 (noting a recent survey of 2207 
executives where only twenty-eight percent said the quality of their companies’ strategic 
decisions was generally good, sixty percent thought that bad decisions were about as 
frequent as good ones, and twelve percent thought good decisions were altogether 
infrequent). 
 98. See Linda Argote & Henrich R. Greve, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm—40 Years 
and Counting: Introduction and Impact, 18 ORG. SCI. 337 (2007) (surveying A Behavioral 
Theory of the Firm’s impact on organizational science research, including institutional 
theory and population ecology); Giovanni Dosi & Luigi Marengo, On the Evolutionary and 
Behavioral Theories of Organizations: A Tentative Roadmap, 18 ORG. SCI. 491 (2007). 
 99. See Argote & Greve, supra note 98, at 343. 
 100. See John A. List, Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?, 118 Q.J. 
ECON. 41 (2003) [hereinafter List, Market Experience]; John A. List, Neoclassical Theory 
Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace, 72 ECONOMETRICA 615, 615 
(2004). For example, frequent and more experienced sports cards traders display less of an 
endowment effect for sports cards (such as baseball trading cards) than for other items, such 
as chocolates and mugs. List, Market Experience, supra, at 44. 
 101. Paul C. Nystrom, Differences in Moral Values Between Corporations, 9 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 971, 974–76 (1990) (describing how closely matched corporations within industrial 
sectors differed significantly in the perceived importance of the management’s moral 
values). 
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monitoring costs and increase their competitiveness by 
inculcating a unique identity.102  
Neoclassical economic theory, with its assumption of rational agents, offers few 
insights on such intrafirm behavior. Logically, if firms behaved as rational profit 
maximizers, one would not expect this form of competition. Rational firms could 
not enjoy a competitive advantage in how they search and incorporate knowledge, 
since they all automatically search for and act upon the optimal amount of 
information. One would therefore not expect business executives to expend 
resources on improving their decision processes if they indeed behaved as rational 
profit maximizers. Moreover, one would expect rational choice theory to dominate 
the MBA curricula. Instead, the strategic management texts, one survey found, 
provide “precious little support” for the Chicago School’s theory of the firm.103 
3. No Unifying Theory 
A third criticism is that behavioral economics, while identifying the predictive 
shortcomings of neoclassical economic theory, does not provide an alternative 
unifying theory to explain human or firm behavior.104 But this criticism 
misconstrues the purpose of behavioral economics. Neoclassical economic theory 
has supplied an organizing principle, as well as an important level of nuance, by 
importing new microeconomic thinking into competition law. The purpose of 
behavioral economics is to augment neoclassical economic theory by providing 
more realistic assumptions of human behavior. By teaching that humans may 
behave “predictably irrationally,”105 behavioral economics provides a mechanism 
for policy makers to consider whether and to what extent they should refine 
existing frameworks to account for nuances in human behavior.  
Behavioral economics does not necessarily call for less or more antitrust 
regulation. If anything, it draws into question our reliance on economic theory 
when the evidence suggests otherwise. It calls into question our preoccupation with 
the cost of false positives (which has taken prominence over the last thirty years) 
while not attending to the cost of false negatives. And, as discussed below, it raises 
questions about our ability to predict outcomes and optimize efficiency through 
antitrust’s rule of reason standard, suggesting that antitrust’s prevailing legal 
standard be brought closer to rule of law principles. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 102. See GEORGE A. AKERLOF & RACHEL E. KRANTON, IDENTITY ECONOMICS: HOW OUR 
IDENTITIES SHAPE OUR WORK, WAGES, AND WELL-BEING 39–59 (2010) (exploring how 
workers can abide by shared corporate norms, and lose utility when they put in low effort, 
and how jobholders, if they have only monetary rewards and only economic goals, “will 
game the system insofar as they can get away with it”).  
 103. Norman W. Hawker, Antitrust Insights from Strategic Management, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. 
L. REV. 67, 74 (2003).  
 104. See Mark Kelman, Behavioral Economics as Part of a Rhetorical Duet: A Response 
to Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1577, 1586 (1998) (“[B]ehavioral 
economics can better be seen as a series of particular counterstories, formed largely in 
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 105. ARIELY, supra note 10. 
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4. Rule of Law Concerns 
Another criticism is that, even if neoclassical economic analysis does not 
indicate the correct result in every case, it has promoted greater predictability and 
consistency in antitrust analysis.106 The fear is that behavioral economics will 
increase the range of outcomes reached in an antitrust case, and thus inject more 
unpredictability into competition law. 
We are sensitive to this concern. Antitrust law must comport as much as feasible 
with rule of law principles. Possible civil or criminal liability should not depend on 
the latest economic theory. Neoclassical economic theory has provided a basis for 
evaluating antitrust cases, and in some cases, simply stated legal norms. Moreover, 
while economic theory has many dialects, it can provide a common language for 
competition authorities across the globe. 
But neoclassical economic theory has its imperfections. First, as discussed 
below, neoclassical theory, because of its dependence on a flawed assumption of 
rationality, provides an incomplete, and at times incorrect, account of competition. 
Antitrust legal standards that rely on neoclassical theory can lead to high error 
costs, thereby undercutting the goals of competition law. Through a more 
persuasive and complex theory of rationality, behavioral economics can provide a 
superior account of competition, can lead to more empirically based presumptions 
in antitrust’s legal standards, and can result in more informed antitrust enforcement.  
Second, it is debatable whether neoclassical economic theory’s reliance on the 
rule of reason has provided the desired level of administrability, consistency, 
objectivity, and transparency to antitrust.107 The Supreme Court’s current rule of 
reason standard provides little predictability for market participants, and, in 
combination with class action mechanisms, subjects litigants and trial courts to the 
purgatory of “sprawling, costly, and hugely time-consuming” discovery.108 The 
Court’s alternative per se standard is also unsatisfactory for evaluating many 
ordinary competitive restraints: the risk of false positives counsels against 
expanding rules of per se illegality, while the risk of false negatives counsels 
against expanding predictability through rules of per se legality. 
As Justice Breyer observed in Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc., 
“antitrust law cannot, and should not, precisely replicate economists’ (sometimes 
conflicting) views.”109 Instead, for legal standards in the antitrust context to serve 
their goals of prohibiting anticompetitive conduct while not sweeping in 
procompetitive conduct, they must be as precise as possible. The insights from 
behavioral economics can facilitate that end by providing agencies, courts, and 
legislatures with an additional lens through which to understand the facts before 
them. In some contexts, courts will conclude that the rule of reason is the best 
option. But, it may also mean that in other contexts, lawmakers will take all of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 106. Douglas H. Ginsburg & Derek W. Moore, The Future of Behavioral Economics in 
Antitrust Jurisprudence, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 89, 92 (2010). 
 107. Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1375 (2009) [hereinafter Stucke, Rule of Reason].  
 108. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560 n.6 (2007). 
 109. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 914–15 (2007) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). 
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available empirical economic evidence and create legally rebuttable 
presumptions.110 As we discuss below, behavioral economics can play an important 
role in that endeavor by explaining how actual, real-world evidence that contradicts 
(or is unexplainable under) a neoclassical economic theory may nevertheless be 
insightful in understanding whether conduct is pro- or anti-competitive. 
II. THE PERSISTENCE OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY IN ANTITRUST LAW 
Although behavioral economics, as Part I discusses, has become a growth stock, 
this Part discusses how the assumption of rational, self-interested profit maximizers 
became and remains embedded in antitrust policy. 
A. The Chicago School’s Assumption of Rationality  
When Congress enacted the federal antitrust laws, it neither endorsed the 
assumption of a rational profit maximizer, nor dictated the application of any 
particular economic theory.111 Congress instead sought to strike a balance between 
(i) providing the courts with sufficient latitude to shape those laws over time and 
(ii) not giving the courts unfettered discretion to interpret the antitrust laws so as to 
advance a particular judge’s ideology.112  
For several decades, the Supreme Court utilized a variety of economic 
organizing principles in its antitrust jurisprudence.113 Broadly speaking, however, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 110. See Arndt Christiansen & Wolfgang Kerber, Competition Policy with Optimally 
Differentiated Rules Instead of “Per Se Rules vs. Rule of Reason,” 2 J. COMPETITION L. & 
ECON. 215, 219 (2006); Alfred E. Kahn, Standards for Antitrust Policy, 67 HARV. L. REV. 
28, 41 (1953). 
 111. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 249 
(1985) (“The legislative histories of the various antitrust laws fail to exhibit anything 
resembling a dominant concern for economic efficiency.”); George J. Stigler, The 
Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 3 (1982) (“A careful 
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actively combatting collusion or monopolization in the economy at large.”). 
 112. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20–21 (1997) (noting that Congress 
“expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on common-
law tradition” (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 
(1978))); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) (“The Sherman 
Act . . . . invokes the common law itself, and not merely the static content that the common 
law had assigned to the term in 1890.”); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 
(1940) (noting that the “vagueness of [the Sherman Act’s] language” left it to the courts to 
give “content to the statute”). 
 113. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836–1937, at 268 
(1991) (“One of the great myths about American antitrust policy is that courts began to adopt 
an ‘economic approach’ to antitrust problems only in the 1970’s. At most, this ‘revolution’ 
in antitrust policy represented a change in economic models. Antitrust policy has been 
forged by economic ideology since its inception.”); see also William E. Kovacic & Carl 
Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 
(2000) (surveying the role of economics in antitrust since the Sherman Act’s inception).  
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in the thirty-year period that preceded the Chicago School’s inception, the Court 
sought four aims.114  
First, the Court generally (but not always) sought a rule that was administrable 
for generalist judges.115 With some notable exceptions, the Court turned to the 
Sherman Act’s legislative history or common law precedent as a basis for its 
rules.116 
Second, the Court sought legal rules to enhance predictability. For example, in 
devising the thirty percent presumption for mergers, the Court sought to foster 
business autonomy: unless business executives “can assess the legal consequences 
of a merger with some confidence, sound business planning is retarded.”117 The 
Court’s role was to provide clearer rules on what was civilly (and criminally) 
illegal under the Sherman Act.118  
Third, the Court sought to prevent the lower courts from being bogged down in 
difficult economic problems, such as trade-offs between inter- and intrabrand 
competition.119 Neither the courts nor litigants could weigh the reduction of 
competition in one area (such as intrabrand competition for Topco private label 
products among Topco member supermarkets) versus greater competition in 
another area (such as interbrand competition between Topco members’ private 
label products and the major supermarkets’ private label goods).120  
Fourth, not only was this weighing beyond its competence, the Court recognized 
that the legislature, while subject to rent seeking, was more politically accountable 
than the judiciary; thus Congress must make these normative trade-offs.121 
The Court’s implementation of these principles resulted in a period of 
unprecedented victories for antitrust enforcement. The Court used per se tests to 
condemn a broad range of conduct including tying arrangements that conditioned 
the sale of one product upon the buyer’s agreement to purchase a second product,122 
nonprice vertical restraints through which a manufacturer limited its resalers to 
specific geographic areas,123 and the adoption of exclusive sales territories by 
marketing joint ventures.124 In the merger context, in its 1963 decision in 
Philadelphia National Bank, the Court aimed for a presumption consistent with the 
congressional concerns in the 1950 Clayton Act amendments to deal with the rising 
tide of economic concentration in the American economy. The Court sought a 
presumptively anticompetitive post-merger market share that was based on figures 
                                                                                                                 
 
 114. See Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 107, at 1401–06. 
 115. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963) (“[I]n any case in 
which it is possible, without doing violence to the congressional objective embodied in [the 
statute], to simplify the test of illegality, the courts ought to do so in the interest of sound and 
practical judicial administration.”). 
 116. Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 107, at 1402–03.  
 117. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 362. 
 118. Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 107, at 1403. 
 119. Id. at 1404–05. 
 120. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
 121. Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 107, at 1405–06. 
 122. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 8 (1958). 
 123. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 377–79 (1967).  
 124. See Topco, 405 U.S. at 608–10.  
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in its earlier Clayton Act cases and that was also consistent with prevailing 
scholarly opinion.125 The Court also, however, placed horizontal mergers that 
created market shares below ten percent in question.126 
As scholars have noted, “[t]here was considerable consistency between judicial 
decisions and economic thinking during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s.”127 But that 
consistency did not, in the eyes of the Court’s critics, provide the doctrinal certitude 
that antitrust law required. Beginning in the mid-1970s, the Chicago School’s 
neoclassical economic theories began to serve that role.128 
Although the “basic features of the Chicago [S]chool of antitrust analysis are 
attributable to the work of Aaron Director in the 1950’s,”129 Robert Bork’s 
Antitrust Paradox130 is widely considered to have laid the foundation for the 
Chicago School’s incorporation into federal antitrust law.131  
Judge Bork argued that contrary to early thinking, the Sherman Act’s legislative 
history “displays the clear and exclusive policy intention of promoting consumer 
welfare,” a term which Bork gave a different meaning than others.132 As the 
Chicago School recognized, defining the goal of antitrust is paramount. This is 
because “[e]verything else follows from the answer we give.”133 So to make the 
rule of reason “more manageable,” the Chicago School adopted the position “that 
the essential spirit of the Rule is to condemn only those practices that are, on 
balance, inefficient in the economic sense.”134 
                                                                                                                 
 
 125. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 365–66 (1963). 
 126. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 551–52 (1966) (blocking a 
merger between two brewing firms that together accounted for twenty-four percent of beer 
sales in Wisconsin, eleven percent of sales in a three-state area of the upper Midwest, and 
less than five percent of sales nationally, holding that the Clayton Act was violated “in each 
and all of these three areas”); United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) 
(enjoining a merger between two Los Angeles grocery chains with no more than 7.5 percent 
of retail sales).  
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Sherman Act is consumer welfare and that Congress intended to accomplish that goal by 
protecting economic efficiency). Bork’s interpretation has been so roundly discredited that 
some have called for a halt of its bashing. See Daniel R. Ernst, The New Antitrust History, 35 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 879, 882–83 (1990). 
 133. BORK, supra note 3, at 50. 
 134. Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on 
the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 16 (1977). 
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The Chicago School next elevated the importance of the rationality assumption. 
Although Posner once said that the “basic tenet of the Chicago [S]chool [is] that 
problems of competition and monopoly should be analyzed using the tools of 
general economic theory,”135 economists disagree on what those tools are. So the 
Chicago School differentiated itself by starting “from the [strong] assumption that 
[market participants] are rational profit maximizers.”136 Adopting this presumption 
allowed Chicago School theorists to more easily predict how rational profit 
maximizers should act. 
A key component in the Chicago School’s thinking is not that rational decision 
making leads to perfect decision making, but that markets are self-correcting and 
will counteract faulty decision making. Except for the rare cases of price-fixing, 
mergers to monopoly, or other sustained market failures,137 government 
intervention is often seen as unnecessary and harmful. The Chicago School’s 
theories do not treat firm behavior any differently from individuals’ collective 
behavior.  
As Posner, Federal Trade Commissioner William Kovacic, and others have 
noted, it is inaccurate to say that the emphasis modern federal antitrust law has 
placed on neoclassical economics is solely attributable to the Chicago School.138 
Nevertheless, whether characterized as Chicago, post-Chicago,139 or Harvard140 
School theory, antitrust’s economic theories for the past thirty years have largely 
assumed that rational profit-maximizing market participants have willpower. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 135. Posner, supra note 129, at 933–34. 
 136. Id. at 928, 933–34 (explaining that neoclassical theories rely on the core theoretical 
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 137. See Posner, supra note 129, at 933. 
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raising their rivals’ cost. See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, 
Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 
209 (1986).  
 140. See Kovacic, supra note 5, at 80 (noting that the Harvard School, through the 
contributions of Donald Turner, Phillip Areeda, and Justice Stephen Breyer, “has had as 
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Court Decisions?, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 59 (2007). 
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B. How the Rationality, Profit Maximization, and Efficiency Assumptions  
Permeate Modern Federal Antitrust Law 
As a result of the Chicago School’s “powerful simplifications,” such as 
“rationality, profit maximization, [and] the downward-sloping demand curve,”141 
neoclassical economic principles now underlie much of modern federal antitrust 
law and pervade the doctrinal analysis that governs sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act as well as merger review.  
In the section 1 context, which involves unreasonable restraints of trade, the 
Chicago School’s rational choice theories played a central role in the Supreme 
Court’s shift from its per se rule to its rule of reason standard.142 In Continental 
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,143 the Court overturned United States v. Arnold, 
Schwinn & Co.144 and held that nonprice vertical restraints were subject to the rule 
of reason. Then in State Oil Co. v. Khan,145 the Court discarded its per se ban on 
maximum resale price maintenance agreements. Citing Posner’s Seventh Circuit 
decision, Bork’s Antitrust Paradox, and Areeda and Hovenkamp’s treatise, the 
Court reasoned that a per se rule was inappropriate where “a considerable body of 
scholarship” suggested maximum resale price maintenance agreements were 
procompetitive and provided “insufficient economic justification for per se 
invalidation” of those agreements.146 More recently, in Leegin,147 the Court 
overruled its nearly century-old per se rule against vertical minimum price-
fixing.148 The Court again turned to the thinking of the Harvard and Chicago 
Schools and cited as authority an amicus brief by several economists to support the 
proposition that “authorities in the economics literature suggest the per se rule is 
inappropriate, and there is now widespread agreement that resale price maintenance 
can have procompetitive effects.”149 
The departure from per se rules has its roots in the Chicago School’s belief that 
the false negatives (and administrative costs) that result from the Court’s rule of 
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reason standard are far less significant than the false positives that follow from its 
per se rules. False negatives are not a concern if one strongly believes in self-
correcting markets arising from self-interested rational market participants. Instead, 
the greater concern is that government restraints (in the form of per se rules or legal 
presumptions of illegality) represent a greater threat to market efficiency. 
Nevertheless, while embracing its rule of reason standard, the Court has, more 
recently, complained of antitrust’s “interminable litigation,”150 “inevitably costly 
and protracted discovery phase,”151 the risk of “frivolous suits,”152 and the 
“unusually high risk” of inconsistent results by antitrust courts.153 So the current 
Court, like the earlier Warren and Burger Courts, lacks confidence in the 
judiciary’s ability to examine difficult economic problems. But rather than provide 
more guidance for courts reviewing antitrust violations under section 1, the Court 
now requires the lower courts to undertake a complex economic rule of reason 
analysis with relatively little concrete guidance.  
Put differently, the importation of the neoclassical ideas in construing section 1 
has left the Court in an awkward position. On the one hand, the Court has relied on 
the Chicago School’s organizing principles to introduce increased complexity in 
the law: if neoclassical economic theory suggests bright-line rules are prohibiting 
procompetitive conduct, the Court’s response has been to expand the rule of reason. 
On the other hand, the Court has resorted to the Chicago School’s principles as a 
justification for simplifying antitrust law by placing the upmost weight on 
administrability and predictability when creating bright-line rules that essentially 
immunize conduct deemed economically irrational. 
The Court’s construction of monopolization claims under section 2 likewise has 
shifted as a result of the Chicago School’s influence, particularly in the predatory 
pricing context where the Court has crafted liability rules that are premised on the 
assumption that firms behave rationally. Under neoclassical thinking, predation 
claims specifically and attempted monopolization claims generally are highly 
unusual in the presence of low entry barriers and rational market participants. For 
any attempted monopolization claim, plaintiffs must demonstrate that “substantial 
barriers to entry protect the market,” and these barriers are “‘significant’ enough to 
confer monopoly power.”154 Notwithstanding the firm’s intent to monopolize a 
market and its anticompetitive conduct, a court could find that rational profit-
maximizing entrants will materialize and rescue the consumer. Similarly, no 
rational firm would engage in predation given the difficulty of recouping its 
losses.155 This reasoning led Frank Easterbrook in 1981 to opine that “there is no 
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sufficient reason for antitrust law or the courts to take predation seriously.”156 This 
view has largely carried the day at the Supreme Court.157 
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,158 for example, the 
Court observed a “consensus among” Chicago School “commentators that 
predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.”159 The 
Court adopted Bork’s view in The Antitrust Paradox that “[a]ny agreement to price 
below the competitive level requires the conspirators to forgo profits that free 
competition would offer them,” and, as such, “[f]or the investment to be rational, 
the conspirators must have a reasonable expectation of recovering, in the form of 
later monopoly profits, more than the losses suffered.”160 
Likewise, in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.161 
(which Bork successfully argued), the Court relied on Matsushita and the writings 
of various prominent Harvard and Chicago School scholars to declare that conduct 
will not amount to predatory pricing unless (i) the alleged scheme involved pricing 
below some measure of cost, and (ii) the predator had a rational prospect of 
recouping its losses from such below-cost predation.162 Consistent with the wealth-
maximizing assumptions that underlie both schools of thought, the Court observed 
that “[r]ecoupment is the ultimate object of an unlawful predatory pricing 
scheme.”163 Most recently in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood 
Lumber Co.,164 the Court applied its Brooke Group test to claims of predatory 
bidding. “Without such a reasonable expectation” of recoupment, the Court wrote, 
“a rational firm would not willingly suffer definite, short-run losses.”165 Given the 
risks in recoupment, a “rational business will rarely make this sacrifice.”166  
But the Court’s reliance on rational choice theory in Brooke Group and 
Weyerhaeuser is inconsistent with its recoupment requirement. The Court’s 
premise is that firms are rational and self-interested. If true, firms ordinarily would 
price their products at or above their marginal cost. Rational firms, Bork believed, 
would rarely, if ever, incur the substantial losses in pricing below marginal cost, 
unless they believed that the future supracompetitive profits, appropriately 
discounted, would exceed the immediate losses.167 So if rational, profit-maximizing 
firms were pricing below marginal cost, this would reveal their reasonable 
expectation of recoupment. Under rational choice theory, the antitrust plaintiff 
should recover simply by proving that the defendant’s prices were below marginal 
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cost.168 But the Court requires antitrust plaintiffs to separately prove a reasonable 
expectation of recoupment. This second element provides antitrust defendants 
another opportunity to avoid liability. Even if pricing below marginal cost, 
defendant could argue that entry barriers are sufficiently low, so that rational profit 
maximizers would defeat any attempted exercise of market power. If true, 
defendant, under rational choice theory, should not have priced below marginal 
cost in the first place. Although the Court has not adopted the Chicago School’s 
view of per se legality for predatory pricing,169 its rule essentially immunizes 
conduct deemed economically irrational.170 
Apart from the Sherman Act, the neoclassical economic theories’ rationality 
assumption has influenced U.S. merger law. Some described the earlier Merger 
Guidelines as “a product of the new economic orientation in antitrust law, if not an 
outright product of Chicago School economic theories.”171 These principles can be 
seen in two respects. 
First, in response to critiques by Bork and others from the Chicago and Harvard 
Schools that the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm prohibited mergers 
                                                                                                                 
 
 168. One could argue that imposing the second element of recoupment serves to 
minimize the costs of false positives from the first element, namely the Court’s attempt in 
determining the product’s “appropriate measure of cost.” But if this were driving the Court’s 
concern, then it would have specified what constitutes the appropriate measure of cost (such 
as average variable cost), which raises its own issues. See Russell Pittman, Who Are You 
Calling Irrational? Marginal Costs, Variable Costs, and the Pricing Practices of Firms 
(Econ. Analysis Grp., Discussion Paper EAG 09-3, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/eag/248394.pdf.  
 169. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Harvard and Chicago Schools and the Dominant 
Firm, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 109, 110 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) 
(characterizing Brooke Group as a victory for the Harvard School because the Court adopted 
the view that predatory pricing could be illegal provided there was an opportunity for 
recoupment).  
 170. The Tenth Circuit noted in the government’s most recent predatory pricing case, 
“[r]ecent scholarship has challenged the notion that predatory pricing schemes are 
implausible and irrational.” United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1114 (10th Cir. 
2003) (citing Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: 
Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2241 (2000) (“[M]odern economic 
analysis has developed coherent theories of predation that contravene earlier economic 
writing claiming that predatory pricing conduct is irrational.”)). The Tenth Circuit, while 
approaching the DOJ’s predatory pricing claims “with caution,” did “not do so with the 
incredulity that once prevailed.” AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1115. The DOJ still lost, however. 
See id. at 1120–21. 
 171. Herbert Hovenkamp, Merger Actions for Damages, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 937, 947 n.43 
(1984); see also Eleanor M. Fox, Introduction: The 1982 Merger Guidelines: When 
Economists Are Kings?, 71 CAL. L. REV. 281, 283 (1983) (“The 1982 Merger Guidelines 
. . . . represent a new positivism; a reduction of legal principles to a simple, unitary, quasi-
scientific, outcome-oriented economic model that, in a generalized sense, has been offered as 
the model for solving all antitrust problems. By embodying only one substantive goal—
allocative efficiency—the model offers the appearance of clarity, predictability, and reduced 
government intervention.”). 
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among small firms that could generate efficiencies, the agencies allowed for a more 
fulsome consideration of efficiencies in the 1982 Guidelines.172 
Second, consistent with the Court’s decision in General Dynamics,173 the 1982 
Guidelines embraced the neoclassical idea that, concentration ratios 
notwithstanding, a firm’s market share may not accurately reflect the firm’s long-
term competitive viability. Thus, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) serves to 
reduce the risk of false positives by creating what are generally viewed as “safe 
harbors.” If a merger’s HHI (a measure of the industry concentration that will result 
from the merger)174 falls within those safe harbors, the merger is typically not 
challenged. On the other hand, high market shares post-merger in highly 
concentrated industries are insufficient. The antitrust agencies must still prove a 
compelling competitive effects story (namely, how this merger significantly 
increases the risk of coordinated or unilateral anticompetitive effects) and why the 
exercise of market power will not be squelched by the entry (or expansion) of 
rational, profit-maximizing firms. 
In short, since the Chicago School’s ascendance in the mid-1970s, antitrust law 
has embraced neoclassical principles at every turn. While these principles may have 
been motivated by the desire to increase predictability (and, in turn, lead to fewer 
false positives), it is not altogether clear that the neoclassical antitrust theories led 
to those results. In some cases, the desire to subject conduct to a rule-of-reason 
framework, so as not to prohibit procompetitive conduct, decreased predictability. 
As discussed below, the behavioral economics literature provides insights into 
ways to further sharpen antitrust rules to result in fewer false positives and false 
negatives over the long run. 
III. HOW CAN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS INFORM ANTITRUST POLICIES? 
As the survey in Part II suggests, neoclassical economic theory now covers the 
landscape of federal antitrust law. When the antitrust agencies and federal courts 
analyze anticompetitive conduct or evaluate a proposed or consummated merger, 
they generally apply certain assumptions about firm and individual behavior, 
including: (i) markets characterized by low entry barriers do not pose antitrust 
concerns—these markets are not susceptible to the prolonged exercise of market 
power because rational profit maximizers will enter; (ii) many mergers generate 
                                                                                                                 
 
 172. See BORK, supra note 3, at 217. During his tenure as Assistant Attorney General, 
Donald Turner of the Harvard School asked Oliver Williamson to study the issue, which 
resulted in a paper showing the economic irrationality of merger policy that did not take 
efficiencies into account. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The 
Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968). Williamson’s paper, in turn, led to the 
inclusion of a narrow efficiencies defense in the first Merger Guidelines, which the 1982 
Merger Guidelines revisions more fully embraced and expanded. See also U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § V.A (1982). 
 173. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). 
 174. HHIs are derived by summing the squares of each competitor’s market share. The 
first important variable is the industry’s HHI post-merger. The second important variable is 
the change in HHI, namely the number of points by which the merger increases the market’s 
HHI. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 32, § 6.3. 
1554 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:1527 
 
significant efficiencies; (iii) rational big buyers often thwart the exercise of market 
power; and (iv) general deterrence of cartels is achievable under optimal deterrence 
theory. 
These assumptions—which are based on the tenets of neoclassical economic 
theory of plausible behavior—can and do have outcome-determinative effects. 
Federal courts regularly grant defendants’ summary judgment motions if plaintiffs’ 
antitrust claims do not make “economic sense,” such as alleging economically 
irrational (non-profit-maximizing) behavior.175 Now Twombly has opened the door 
for defendants at the pleading stage to argue that plaintiffs’ antitrust claims are 
economically implausible.176 Similarly, “[c]urrent U.S. merger enforcement 
policy,” reported the Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC), “is premised on 
assumptions about how concentration and other market characteristics (such as ease 
of entry) affect competition and market power.”177 The problem the AMC 
identified is that the “[e]mpirical evidence gives only limited support for these 
assumptions.”178 As one former antitrust official observed, the agencies’ “merger 
review process is applied sparingly,” as the “vast majority of transactions” 
(approximately ninety-seven percent) “are cleared within the initial waiting 
period.”179 
This is all to say that assumptions play a critical role in winnowing the types of 
conduct that go to discovery and/or trial, as well as the number of mergers that the 
antitrust agencies actually review as potentially anticompetitive. If the assumptions 
are infirm, then conceivably some of the conduct that is exonerated and the mergers 
that are not reviewed may be anticompetitive. 
A. Assumption that Rational Profit Maximizers Will Defeat the Exercise of Market 
Power in Markets Characterized by Low Entry Barriers 
Neoclassical antitrust analysis treats the potential for entry as significant—if not 
sometimes dispositive—in determining whether the existing market participants 
will exercise market power. The analysis assumes that markets characterized by 
low entry barriers are not susceptible to the prolonged exercise of market power 
                                                                                                                 
 
 175. See Leslie, supra note 33, at 272 (noting plaintiff’s two-step rationality burden); see 
also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 467 (1992) (citing 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 594 n.19, 596–97 
(1986) (summary judgment is appropriate where antitrust claim “simply makes no economic 
sense”)); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 614 (7th Cir. 
1997) (Posner, J.) (arguing that summary judgment for defendants is proper, even if there is 
some evidence of an antitrust violation, if plaintiff’s theory makes no economic sense).  
 176. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 177. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 61–62 
(2007) [hereinafter AMC REPORT], available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_ 
recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf.  
 178. Id. at 62.  
 179. Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Merger Review: A Quest for Efficiency, Address to New York State Bar Association 
Antitrust Section Annual Meeting (Jan. 25, 2007), available at http://www.justice. 
gov/atr/public/speeches/221173.htm. 
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because (i) supracompetitive prices will attract rational profit-maximizing firms, 
(ii) these new entrants will replenish the lost output, and (iii) as a result of entry, 
prices will return closer to marginal cost.180  
With the exception of criminal prosecutions of cartels,181 this assumption 
pervades the Sherman Act case law. In the section 1 context, courts have observed 
that the absence of entry barriers means a predatory pricing conspiracy is 
implausible. In Matsushita, plaintiffs argued that they had adduced facts to show a 
plausible conspiracy to engage in predatory pricing.182 The Supreme Court, 
however, observed that the antitrust plaintiffs “offer no reason to suppose that entry 
into the relevant market is especially difficult, yet without barriers to entry it would 
presumably be impossible to maintain supracompetitive prices for an extended 
time.”183  
Likewise, in the section 2 context, for Bork and others, monopolies (other than 
those protected by the government) are short-term phenomena: the innovator’s 
supracompetitive profits serve as bait for imitators, who “first reduce and then 
annihilate [the monopolist’s] profit,” which reverts to the competitive mean.184 
Innovation attracts imitation, which leads to commoditization. Courts therefore will 
frequently analyze whether a firm can attempt to monopolize, or monopolize, a 
market by examining the likelihood of entry.185 
Entry barriers are also a key factor under the Merger Guidelines. The federal 
antitrust agencies lost a series of merger challenges when courts found that easy 
entry would deter any anticompetitive effects.186 The agencies thereafter adopted a 
more extensive entry provision in their Guidelines, which set forth what the 
agencies believe is required: that entry be “timely, likely, and sufficient . . . to deter 
or counteract the competitive effects of concern.”187 Merger analysis for the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 180. See, e.g., Ball Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1335 (7th 
Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J.) (noting how “the lower the barriers to entry, and the shorter the 
lags of new entry, the less power existing firms have”). 
 181. The DOJ prosecutors have been successful in preserving the Court’s per se rule on 
horizontal price fixing, bid rigging, market or customer allocations, and output reductions. If 
executives conspire to fix prices, they are liable even though entry barriers are low or such 
behavior is economically irrational. 
 182. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 577–78 (1986). 
 183. Id. at 591 n.15. 
 184. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 89 (1934); see 
BORK, supra note 3, at 195–97. 
 185. See, e.g., Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1256 (11th Cir. 2002) (affirming 
summary judgment for defendant in Robinson Patman Act case where plaintiff failed to 
show the presence of entry barriers and noting that “the ease or difficulty of entry” is “[t]he 
most significant structural factor bearing on the ability to recoup predatory losses through 
inflated prices” because “[w]here a market has low barriers to entry, sellers charging 
supracompetitive prices will soon attract new competitors”); AD/SAT v. Associated Press, 
181 F.3d 216, 229–30 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming summary judgment for defendant on 
attempted monopolization claim and noting that the presence of “low barriers to market 
entry” suggested that the defendant would “face significant competition from new entrants”).  
 186. See AMC REPORT, supra note 177, at 71 n.40. 
 187. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 32, § 9.0. 
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agencies “generally entails a hypothetical analysis of entry.”188 In markets where 
entry theoretically would be timely (that is, occurring in less than two years), 
likely, and sufficient in magnitude, character, and scope to deter the exercise of 
market power, then the “merger is not likely to enhance market power.”189 For 
mergers subject to a Second Request between the years 1996 and 2003, the FTC 
stated that it took no enforcement action where its staff concluded that entry would 
be timely, likely, and sufficient under the Merger Guidelines criteria.190 
When the antitrust agencies believe that entry barriers are sufficiently low to 
defeat the exercise of market power post-merger, there is typically no mechanism 
to minimize the risk of false negatives. Private parties and state attorneys general 
infrequently challenge mergers.191 On the other hand, if the agencies believe that 
entry barriers are sufficiently high to enable the exercise of market power, 
mechanisms exist to reduce the risk of false positives. The merging parties can seek 
to persuade a generalist court (which is less familiar about antitrust issues than the 
agencies) that a hypothetical rational entrant would defeat the exercise of market 
power. The section 7 case law is consistent with this approach: the merging parties 
can use evidence of low entry barriers to successfully rebut any presumption of 
anticompetitive harm. “In the absence of significant barriers,” the courts assume, “a 
company probably cannot maintain supracompetitive pricing for any length of 
time.”192 
The problem is that our understanding regarding the impact of ease of entry on 
competition is, as the AMC found, “limited.”193 The behavioral literature identifies 
two market-entry error types: (i) excess entry (i.e., entry that fails because it is 
economically irrational), and (ii) sparse entry (i.e., entry that should but does not 
                                                                                                                 
 
 188. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TRANSPARENCY AT THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: THE 
HORIZONTAL MERGER REVIEW PROCESS: 1996–2003, at 14 (2005) [hereinafter MERGER 
REVIEW PROCESS], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/02/0502economicissues.pdf.  
 189. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 32, § 9.0. 
 190. See MERGER REVIEW PROCESS, supra note 188, at 78 (noting that of the nineteen 
cases identified, sixteen were in highly concentrated industries).  
 191. See Lawrence M. Frankel, The Flawed Institutional Design of U.S. Merger Review: 
Stacking the Deck Against Enforcement, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 159, 171–72. 
 192. United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“The 
existence and significance of barriers to entry are frequently, of course, crucial 
considerations in a rebuttal analysis.”); see, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 
U.S. 104, 120 n.15 (1986) (recognizing and quoting from Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 591 n.15 (1986), that “without barriers to entry it would 
presumably be impossible to maintain supracompetitive prices for an extended time”); 
United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1990) (“If there are no significant 
barriers to entry . . . any attempt to raise prices above the competitive level will lure into the 
market new competitors able and willing to offer their commercial goods or personal 
services for less.”); United States v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 983 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(easy entry would eliminate any anticompetitive impact of merger in highly concentrated 
industry); FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 54–55 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding 
that ease of entry “can be sufficient to offset the government’s prima facie case of anti-
competitiveness”). 
 193. AMC REPORT, supra note 177, at 62. 
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occur because a firm exhibits irrationality in failing to pursue entry).194 Both 
categories of market-entry error can cast light on ways in which antitrust law’s 
assumptions about entry are imperfect. 
Excess Entry. Entry occurs in some industries when it is economically irrational. 
Indeed, some industries “see perennially high rates of entry, intense competition, 
and high rates of failure.”195 The behavioral economics and behavioral finance 
literature offer at least three possible explanations for this tendency. 
One explanation is the “optimistic bias.”196 The notion is that when individuals 
judge their likelihood of experiencing a good outcome in an event that they have 
some control over—obtaining a favorable job, financial security, or a happy 
marriage—they overestimate their likelihood of success.197 In contrast, when 
individuals estimate the probability that something negative will happen to them—
a car accident from reckless driving, a loss in the stock market, or a divorce—they 
underestimate its likelihood. 
Economists Camerer and Lovallo have shown that this optimism bias carries 
over to entry decision making.198 Their work found that, while participants in a 
given market may correctly realize that the average entrant’s profit would be 
negative, the individual participants will incorrectly expect that their own profits 
will be positive. Moreover, their work found that optimism bias is most pronounced 
in situations they describe as “reference group neglect,”199 where the potential 
entrant believes it has a particular expertise or skill in the given market—even 
where the entrant knows that its competitors believe that they also have a special 
skill. There “is more entry . . . when people are betting on their own relative skill 
rather than on a random device” and “[t]he more surprising finding is that 
overconfidence is even stronger when subjects self-select into the experimental 
sessions, knowing their success will depend partly on their skill (and that others 
have self-selected too).”200 
A second and related explanation is that entrants may be driven by the 
desirability bias. Desirability bias (or “wishful thinking”) is the tendency of 
individuals to predict favorable outcomes in external events that they have no 
control over, but whose outcomes nevertheless implicate their self-perception.201 
                                                                                                                 
 
 194. See Don A. Moore, John M. Oesch & Charlene Zietsma, What Competition? Myopic 
Self-Focus in Market-Entry Decisions, 18 ORG. SCI. 440, 441 (2007). 
 195. Id. at 440 (citation omitted). 
 196. See Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, 
and Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 482, 505–08 (2002) (discussing the principle of 
overconfidence in the context of entry decision making).  
 197. Moore et al., supra note 194, at 440–41 (discussing entrepreneurs’ tendency to rely 
too heavily on internal and personal qualities, rather than external market factors, when 
making decisions). 
 198. See Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An 
Experimental Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 306 (1999).  
 199. Id. at 315. 
 200. Id. at 311, 314. 
 201. See Robert A. Olsen, Desirability Bias Among Professional Investment Managers: 
Some Evidence from Experts, 10 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 65, 65 (1997) (defining 
desirability bias as “the tendency to overpredict desirable outcomes and underpredict 
unwanted outcomes”); see also Tor, supra note 196, at 508–10, 515–16 (discussing the 
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Such errant predictions may occur if entrants (i) overestimate the likelihood that a 
market participant (or participants) will fail or (ii) underestimate the likelihood of 
events in the economy that will negatively affect their prospects of success. In 
terms of antitrust, a party entering a market with low entry barriers could 
overestimate the likelihood that it would obtain the financing to succeed over the 
long run or underestimate the likelihood that new entrants against whom it will 
compete for market share will succeed. As Professor Avishalom Tor, who has 
written extensively in the area of behavioral antitrust, has observed, “[e]ntrants who 
overestimate their prospects are more likely to fail than entrants who make accurate 
average estimates, but their presence also decreases other entrants’ probability of 
success and changes the composition of the final cohort of successful entrants.”202  
A third and related bias occurs when entrants focus on themselves rather than 
understanding competition. One qualitative field study of entrepreneurs found that 
those who started their own businesses thought about their personal abilities, but 
“rarely mentioned external factors such as the capacity of the market they were 
entering or the strength of their competitors.”203 Thus entrants over-enter markets 
they perceive as easy for them (such as restaurants), and do not research the 
external environment or competition.204 
Sparse Entry. At other times, entry does not occur when it is economically 
rational. Thus companies can maintain supracompetitive pricing in markets with 
low entry barriers. Between 1988 and 1996, the DOJ criminally prosecuted cartels 
in dozens of industries that, on the surface, appear to have moderate or low entry 
barriers, including turtles, chain link fences, and bicycle retailers.205 Other recent 
cartels involved college textbooks,206 packaged ice,207 scrap metal,208 bid rigging at 
public real estate foreclosure auctions,209 and retail gasoline and diesel fuel.210 The 
behavioral economics literature offers two possible explanations for the absence of 
entry in these markets. 
                                                                                                                 
application of desirability bias to entry in the antitrust context). 
 202. Tor, supra note 196, at 531. 
 203. Moore et al., supra note 194, at 441. 
 204. Id. at 444. 
 205. See Stucke, supra note 68, at 565–66 (collecting cases revealing price fixing in 
markets that superficially, at least, appear to have moderate or low entry barriers).  
 206. Indictment, United States v. Saner, 313 F. Supp. 2d 896 (S.D. Ind. 2004) (No. IP 
03181-CR), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f201500/201507.pdf. 
 207. Information, United States v. Home City Ice Co., No. 07-CR-140 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 
5, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f234200/234205.htm. 
 208. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Cleveland Scrap Metal Dealer and Owner 
Indicted in Antitrust Conspiracy (Feb. 6, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
atr/public/press_releases/2008/229926.htm (conspiracy involved industrial scrap metal 
dealers who generally place collection boxes at manufacturers’ sites to collect scrap metal, 
then pick it up, process it, and resell it to customers). 
 209. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, California Real Estate Executive Pleads Guilty 
to Bid Rigging (Apr. 16, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/ 
press_releases/2010/ 257801.htm. 
 210. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Convenience Store Company and Individual 
Charged with Retail Gasoline Price Fixing in Oklahoma (Sept. 19, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2008/237430.htm. 
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One explanation is that, while information is available, individuals do not react 
to risk or uncertainty as a rational profit maximizer would. The efficient market 
hypothesis, like rational choice theory generally, assumes that so long as 
information is publicly available, rational, profit-maximizing traders will enter 
financial markets if there are irrational price moves to maintain market 
efficiency.211 Thus, under the efficient market hypothesis, stocks are consistently 
priced at a “rational” level: stock prices of actively traded companies quickly adjust 
to reflect the rational expectations generated by information as it becomes 
available.212 As recent events have proven (and as the behavioral finance literature 
shows), rational arbitrageurs do not, however, always exploit obvious fiscal 
opportunities to restore prices to their fundamental value.213 The behavioral finance 
literature also suggests that sparse entry may result from the fact that the 
information needed to make a rational decision about entry can be costly to acquire, 
process, and verify.214 
A second explanation for sparse entry is the flip side of the overconfidence bias: 
while people are overconfident with respect to easy tasks, they rate themselves well 
below average on difficult tasks. So rates of entry, in one behavioral experiment, 
differed dramatically for difficult and simple tasks. In the experiment, participants 
over-entered when the quiz was simple (sixty-nine percent of the time), but entered 
less often on rounds when the quiz was difficult (thirty-nine percent of the time), 
even though they stood to profit in entering the difficult rounds.215 There was no 
evidence that the university students learned to avoid these mistakes over twelve 
rounds.216 In basing entry largely on their myopic judgment, the participants failed 
to see profitable opportunities where less competition existed. 
These insights from the behavioral literature suggest that hypothetical entry 
barriers are only part of understanding market entry. At times, some businesses 
proclaim to the antitrust agencies that they would enter in response to a small but 
significant nontransitory increase in price (SSNIP). Accurately predicting an 
entrant’s success, however, requires a more complete understanding of the biases 
                                                                                                                 
 
 211. See Stucke, supra note 68, at 569–70. 
 212. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly 
Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 770–72 (1985) (explaining the 
efficient market hypothesis); Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? 
Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 646–48 
(1995) (describing the concept of the efficient market hypothesis in modern financial 
theory); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 554–65 (1984) (detailing principles of market efficiency). 
 213. For an account of the rise and fall of the efficient market hypothesis, see FOX, supra 
note 8. 
 214. Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New 
Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 637 (2003) (noting that because information is costly to obtain, 
process, and verify, “it is impossible for every participant in securities markets to actually 
acquire, understand, and validate all the available information that might be relevant to 
valuing securities”); see also Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market 
Meets Behavioral Finance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 455 (2006) (discussing examples where 
arbitrage should occur in financial markets, but does not). 
 215. Moore et al., supra note 194, at 449. 
 216. Id. at 450. 
1560 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:1527 
 
that skew the entrant’s wealth maximization calculus. At other times, even if entry 
barriers are low, entry will not occur despite the profit opportunity. A more fulsome 
entry analysis should therefore consider factors apart from entry barriers, such as: 
(i) why entry does not occur in markets when antitrust’s rational choice theory 
predicts it would, (ii) why others enter markets when it is economically irrational, 
and (iii) what a prospective entrant’s likelihood of success is, in recognition of 
possible optimism bias. 
B. Assumption that Companies Merge to Generate Significant Efficiencies 
Antitrust policy assumes that companies often merge to obtain efficiencies. “All 
of us know,” one Bush antitrust official remarked, “that the rationale for most 
mergers is procompetitive and that most mergers have no adverse effects on 
competition.”217 Some noted that the change from the 1960s is “more than anything 
else . . . the perception that many, if not most, mergers are efficiency-enhancing, a 
fact that has come to the forefront with the need to permit American firms to be 
competitive in international markets.”218 The antitrust agencies believe that “[t]he 
vast majority of mergers pose no harm to consumers, and many produce 
efficiencies that benefit consumers in the form of lower prices, higher quality goods 
or services, or investments in innovation.”219 The belief is that profit-maximizing 
firms merge to generate efficiencies and/or to achieve market power. If the merger 
generates neither, it is economically irrational. 
The Merger Guidelines likewise state that “a primary benefit of mergers to the 
economy is their potential to generate significant efficiencies and thus enhance the 
merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, which may result in lower prices, 
improved quality, enhanced service, or new products.”220 Although the Merger 
Guidelines treat efficiencies as a defense, the merging parties can use efficiencies 
to explain why the merger is unlikely to lead to coordinated effects; that is, the 
efficiencies will reduce the merged firm’s marginal costs resulting in a “new 
maverick firm” that has less incentive to engage in tacit or express collusion.221 
Consequently, “[t]he Agencies will not challenge a merger if cognizable 
                                                                                                                 
 
 217. William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div. of the U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, What Is Competition?, Address Before the Seminar on Convergence (Oct. 
28, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/200440.htm. 
 218. Thomas E. Kauper, Merger Control in the United States and the European Union: 
Some Observations, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 305, 328 (2000). 
 219. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL 
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interference with that larger universe of mergers that are either competitively beneficial or 
neutral.”). For a detailed account of the evolution of the efficiencies defense, see William J. 
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 221. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 32, § 10. 
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efficiencies are of a character and magnitude such that the merger is not likely to be 
anticompetitive in any relevant market.”222  
At times, the antitrust agencies reject the merging parties’ efficiencies defense, 
and no federal court to date has relied on efficiencies in rejecting the antitrust 
agencies’ challenge to an otherwise anticompetitive merger. But efficiencies 
continue to play a significant role in the agencies’ merger review. In recent closing 
statements, for example, the DOJ highlighted the likely efficiencies from mergers 
in the highly concentrated telephone,223 satellite radio,224 airline,225 and home 
appliance226 industries. The DOJ noted that “one of the key parts” of its 
investigation of a proposed joint venture between two beer companies was having 
“verified that the joint venture” between Miller and Coors was “likely to produce 
substantial and credible savings that will significantly reduce the companies’ costs 
of producing and distributing beer.”227 
Recent changes to the Merger Guidelines in 1997 and 2010 emphasize that 
“[e]fficiencies are difficult to verify and quantify . . . because much of the 
information relating to efficiencies is uniquely in the possession of the merging 
firms,” and that, “[m]oreover, efficiencies projected reasonably and in good faith 
by the merging firms may not be realized.”228 Indeed, in several notable cases—
AOL/Time Warner and Sony/Columbia Pictures to name a few—the parties poorly 
predicted the mergers’ likely efficiencies.229 And if the events in the financial 
sector in the fall of 2008 are any indication, in many of the bank mergers that 
preceded the financial crisis, the banks failed to sustain their anticipated growths in 
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 228. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 32, § 10.  
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profit.230 As economist F.M. Scherer observed, “making mergers is a risky 
proposition” and many “fail to live up to expectations and may indeed make 
matters worse rather than better.”231 For Scherer, “[m]aking mergers is a form of 
gambling; skill matters, but there is an important chance component.”232 
The unrealized efficiencies in these cases may have resulted from incomplete 
information or unanticipated events (such as an economic downturn). However, 
these phantom efficiencies may also be the result of the biases discussed in the 
behavioral economics literature. 
One explanation is that in competitive settings—such as auctions and bidding 
wars—passion may trump reason. Rational choice theory assumes that in an 
auction, each profit-maximizing bidder assumes that the other bidders are also 
rational. In bidding wars (whether for antique furniture or a multi-million-dollar 
firm), passion and optimism may prevail, leading participants to overvalue the 
purchased assets.  
In a recent experiment, neuroscientists and economists combined brain imaging 
techniques and behavioral economics research to better understand why individuals 
overbid.233 Specifically, they examined whether the fear of losing the social 
competition inherent in an auction game causes people to overpay. Members in the 
“loss-frame” group were given fifteen dollars at the beginning of each auction 
round. If they won the auction for that round, they would get to keep the fifteen 
dollars and the payoff from the auction.234 If they lost, they would have to return 
the fifteen dollars. Members in the “bonus-frame” group, on the other hand, were 
told that if they won that auction round they would get a fifteen-dollar bonus at the 
end of the round. Whether one gets fifteen dollars at the beginning or end of the 
auction round should not affect a rational player: the winner of each round gets 
fifteen extra dollars, the loser gets nothing. Nonetheless, the loss-frame group 
members outbid the bonus-frame group members, although both outbid the baseline 
group.235 
A second possible explanation is that corporate executives suffer from “self-
attribution bias,” meaning that (fueled by their successes with prior mergers) they 
are overconfident in their management skills and believe that the next merger will 
yield similar or greater efficiencies.236 A study of a sample of public acquisitions 
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 235. Id. at 1852. 
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that occurred between 1985 and 2002 found that CEOs who previously engaged in 
a successful acquisition appeared to overestimate their role in successful deals, 
leading to more deals, even though these subsequent deals are value destructive.237 
Moreover, the study found that CEOs tend to engage in stock purchases that reflect 
this bias (engaging in more aggressive stock acquisitions prior to each successive 
deal).238 
In short, antitrust enforcers do not regularly revisit mergers, so it is unclear 
whether the claimed efficiencies actually materialize. Thus, one cannot assume that 
most mergers are procompetitive. More empirical research is needed to determine 
to what extent close-call mergers generate significant efficiencies.239 Such research 
may help identify factors of when, and under what circumstances, the claimed 
efficiencies will likely occur. 
C. Assumption that Rational Big Buyers Will Thwart the Exercise of Market Power 
Neoclassical economics assumes that cartels are more unstable with big or 
“power buyers.” Big buyers use their purchasing power to negotiate a lower price 
by playing one cartel member off the other. If the cartel members stand firm, the 
big buyer can take its business to fringe firms outside of the cartel, sponsor a new 
entrant by offering non-price perks such as favorable product placement or more 
shelf space, or vertically integrate. Knowing this, rational cartel members likely 
will defect before the big buyer fulfills its threat. As Posner said,  
The concentration of the buying side of a market does inhibit collusion. 
The bigger a buyer is, the more easily and lucratively a member of the 
cartel can cheat on his fellows; for with a single transaction, he may be 
able to increase his sales and hence profits dramatically. But with all 
the members thus vying for the large orders of big buyers, the cartel 
will erode.240  
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 240. Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1391 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.). The 
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Id. (emphasis in original). 
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Again, this assumption is important in weighing the costs of false positives and 
negatives. It is hard to test the degree to which large, sophisticated buyers reliably 
defeat the formation and maintenance of tacit or express collusion. Detecting 
cartels is difficult by itself. Determining whether a cartel would have formed but 
for the presence of a big buyer is even more difficult. One could study the extent to 
which cartels carved out markets with big buyers, but that would not explain how 
cartels thrived despite the existence of big buyers. 
Support for the power buyer argument has waned in the federal antitrust 
agencies.241 But the issue of power buyers still arises in the agencies’ merger 
review. In deciding not to challenge Whirlpool Corporation’s acquisition of Maytag 
Corporation, for example, the DOJ noted that “the large retailers through which the 
majority of these appliances are sold—Sears, Lowe’s, The Home Depot and Best 
Buy—have alternatives available to help them resist an attempt by the merged 
entity to raise prices.”242  
Even when the antitrust agencies believe that power buyers could not defeat the 
exercise of market power, a generalist court may disagree. Although some courts 
have noted that evidence of power buyers is insufficient to independently rebut a 
prima facie case,243 the presence of power buyers remains an important factor in 
evaluating whether a merger violates section 7.244 
The citric acid cartel is one example. In 1991, a federal district court judge 
denied the DOJ’s challenge to Archer-Daniels-Midland’s (ADM) long-term lease 
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2011] BEHAVIORAL ANTITRUST 1565 
 
agreement with a competitor. The court believed that ADM’s customers were 
sufficiently powerful to counteract any non-cost-based price hike.245 The court 
observed that ongoing “consolidation of buying power [was] an effective means of 
counteracting any potential market power that might be exercised by sellers”—an 
observation that was “borne out by both economic theory and the facts.”246 The 
court found that the power buyers had used a variety of tactics to obtain low prices 
from high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) suppliers, including “playing off suppliers 
against one another, swinging volume back and forth among suppliers, disciplining 
sellers by cutting them off entirely, successfully insisting on year long or multi-year 
tolling agreements, and holding out the threat of inducing a new entrant into HFCS 
production.”247 Consequently, “the size and sophistication of buyers” in the 
industry was “a powerful ‘other factor’ that strongly mitigates against the 
possibility of any attempt by . . . suppliers to raise prices anticompetitively.”248 
The DOJ later prosecuted ADM and others for engaging in a cartel relating to 
citric acid. As one former DOJ official subsequently noted, it was “particularly 
ironic” that the perpetrators and victims of the citric acid cartel [Coca-Cola and 
Procter & Gamble] “included some of the very same firms that the district court 
found were unlikely to engage in or be vulnerable to cartel activity in refusing to 
enjoin an acquisition by ADM of one of its leading rivals in the high fructose corn 
syrup market back in 1991.”249 In the ensuing private litigation, Judge Posner, 
writing for the Seventh Circuit, rejected the defendants’ argument that the presence 
of large buyers (including Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola) as a matter of economic 
theory defeated the possibility of price fixing: although these “very large buyers” 
drove hard bargains and obtained large discounts from the list price of HFCS, “it 
does not follow that the defendants could not and did not fix the price of HFCS 
55.”250 
Indeed, going down the DOJ’s list of Sherman Act violations yielding a corporate 
fine of ten million dollars or more,251 one finds other recent international price-fixing 
cartels with big buyers as victims. The lysine cartel—featured in the film The 
Informant! (based on a book of the same name)252—is one example. There the world’s 
major lysine manufacturers orchestrated an international cartel that caused a seventy 
percent price increase in its first nine months. The cartel victims included Tyson Foods 
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(the largest purchaser of lysine in the United States) and ConAgra (whose consumer 
brands are found in ninety-seven percent of U.S. households).253 The liquid crystal 
display panels cartel254 harmed “some of the largest computer, television and cellular 
telephone manufacturers in the world, including Apple, Dell and Motorola.”255 The air 
transportation cartel (among the “largest and most far-reaching antitrust conspiracies 
ever detected by the Division”)256 affected “thousands of businesses—from the corner 
store to the biggest corporation.”257 The Dynamic Random Access Memory cartel 
harmed some of the world’s largest manufacturers of personal computers and servers, 
including Dell, Compaq, Hewlett-Packard, Apple, IBM, and Gateway.258 The graphite 
electrodes conspiracy affected sales to steel mills in the United States and abroad.259 
So how should a generalist court respond to the defense that large sophisticated 
buyers could readily defeat the exercise of market power? Skeptically. First, in the 
context of merger challenges, customer testimony is not always credible. Indeed, in 
contrast to the findings in ADM,260 some courts have found that customer testimony 
is not probative of the merger’s likely competitive effects, and consider such 
testimony to be lacking in foundation261 or biased.262 
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Second, the behavioral economics literature suggests that big buyers (like CEOs 
with respect to efficiencies and entry) may be overconfident of their negotiating 
prowess to defeat any non-cost-based price hike. As a result, when the antitrust 
agencies interview big buyers, those buyers may not accurately project their skill 
and power over sellers with market or monopoly power. Additionally, these buyers’ 
responses might be contingent on how the issue is framed. For example, big buyers 
may be genuinely less concerned about protecting their customers (and thereby 
resist any non-cost-based wholesale price increase by the merging parties) than 
taking sales away from their rivals (and thus willing to accept a supracompetitive 
wholesale price, if that price was lower relative to the wholesale prices offered to 
their competitor retailers). 
Once again, more empirical research is needed to determine under what 
circumstances large, sophisticated purchasers have been successful or unsuccessful 
in preventing the exercise of market power. In the short run, however, the revisions 
to the Merger Guidelines suggest that the agencies are willing to look beyond the 
mere fact that a large buyer exists to determine whether that large buyer is actually 
in a position to constrain anticompetitive conduct.263 
D. Reliance on Optimal Deterrence Theory to Deter Cartels 
The DOJ’s criminal antitrust prosecutions are driven more by the facts than 
economic theory. But neoclassical economic theory still influences antitrust 
policies on optimal penalties. The generally accepted approach under neoclassical 
optimal deterrence theory is that a “rational” actor, seeking to maximize profit, will 
weigh the magnitude of a likely penalty and the probability of being detected 
against the gain from a violation before engaging in anticompetitive conduct.264 To 
achieve optimal deterrence, the total penalty levied against a cartel (which includes 
civil damages and criminal penalties) should equal the violation’s expected net 
harm to others (plus enforcement costs) divided by the probability of detection and 
proof of the violation.265 The DOJ, however, unlike some law-and-economics 
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scholars,266 believes that corporate (or individual) fines are inadequate to deter 
cartels and that the threat of incarceration is needed. 
Over the last fifty years, Congress has considerably increased the maximum 
monetary criminal penalties and incarceration periods for antitrust violations. When 
the Sherman Act was enacted in 1890, violations were misdemeanors with a 
maximum fine of $5000 and up to one year of incarceration.267 By 1954, however, 
the then head of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division observed that “over the years a 
precedent has been established: almost never has anyone been committed to jail for 
a Sherman Act offense.”268 Congress responded with stiffer criminal penalties in 
1955,269 1971,270 1984,271 1990,272 and most recently, 2004.273  
Notwithstanding these repeated efforts to adjust the calculation for potential 
cartel members, it is hard to tell how well these stiffer criminal penalties are 
working.274 On the one hand, some cartels have “carv[ed] out the United States 
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from their operations to avoid the risk of criminal sanctions.”275 But despite (i) the 
escalating criminal and civil fines in the United States (and abroad), (ii) treble 
private civil damages, (iii) longer jail sentences, and (iv) a generous leniency 
program, there is no indication that the United States has reached optimal 
deterrence.276 Price-fixers continue to make a skewed cost-benefit calculus (if they 
are, in fact, engaging in any calculus) that leads them to believe that they are better 
off entering a cartel than not. 
The behavioral economics literature suggests that situational and dispositional 
factors may account for such irrational behavior. Optimal deterrence theory 
assumes that financial gains should motivate, and financial penalties should deter, 
self-interested rational agents’ behavior. But some executives refrain from price-
fixing for ethical concerns, fear of social disapproval from their peers, or other 
informal norms.277 Thus, informal norms can have a powerful influence on 
behavior. One cannot assume that by criminalizing conduct, policy makers 
necessarily inculcate these moral and social concerns.278 In developing the informal 
norms against price-fixing by accentuating the conduct’s immoral and unethical 
content, policy makers may be able to better deter cartels.279 
Another factor is the optimism or overconfidence bias discussed above: just as 
individuals overestimate their likelihood of achieving efficiencies or gaining 
successful entry, price-fixers may also overvalue their likelihood of escaping 
prosecution. Yet another factor is the availability heuristic, under which the 
“perceived probability of detection will depend not only on how frequently 
offenses are detected but also on how salient or vivid the method of detection is.”280 
If potential cartel participants have little exposure to recent prosecutions, they are 
apt to undervalue the likelihood of being caught. Some antitrust lawyers therefore 
find it highly effective to include in antitrust compliance programs a former 
executive involved in a price-fixing scandal.281  
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 277. See Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval 
and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 325 
(1980); Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks Is 
Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 1839, 1861–62 (2000); 
Stucke, supra note 28, at 272–79.  
 278. See Caron Beaton-Wells & Fiona Haines, Making Cartel Conduct Criminal: A Case 
Study of Ambiguity in Controlling Business Behavior, 42 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 
218 (2009). 
 279. See Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, supra note 276, at 505–23 (discussing how 
antitrust agencies can promote moral norms to better deter antitrust crimes). 
 280. McAdams & Ulen, supra note 16, at 18. 
 281. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE: PERSPECTIVES AND 
RESOURCES FOR CORPORATE COUNSELORS 34 (2005). Besides these dispositional factors, a 
host of situational factors also may be at work. See Stucke, supra note 28, at 15–42 
(discussing the situational factors and the extent to which they may influence cartel 
formation).  
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Ultimately the economic model must account for social policies that can 
influence the executives’ decision to engage in price-fixing, including the perceived 
probability of detection.282 Thus, the optimal means to deter cartels will involve a 
pluralism of mechanisms, including criminal and civil penalties, structural means 
(improved merger review), and developing informal norms that highlight price-
fixing’s ethical and moral implications. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS GOING FORWARD 
The behavioral economics literature, as Part III discusses, can help the antitrust 
agencies explore which of their assumptions premised on neoclassical theory are 
sheltering anticompetitive conduct and increasing the costs of false negatives. This 
Part proposes several actions that the agencies can undertake to advance behavioral 
antitrust. As a first principle, behavioral economics can instill in antitrust policy 
makers the importance of nuance and not being tethered to particular mainstream 
modes of thinking when factual reality does not square with economic orthodoxy. 
A. To Be Applied Well, Behavioral Antitrust Requires More Empirical Work 
Some skeptics will continue to question whether irrational conduct has any 
implications for antitrust analysis. But whatever its label, behavioral economics at 
its core is empirical. The literature first identifies normative assumptions 
underlying the prevalent economic theories; second, empirically tests these 
assumptions and considers alternative explanations; and third, uses the anomalies to 
create new theories that are further empirically tested.  
We believe that behavioral economics identifies enough holes in the simplistic 
rationality assumption to fortify the argument for more empirical work in antitrust 
policy. One need not be a behavioral economist to agree. Commissioner Kovacic, 
among others, has long called for more empirically driven research policies, noting 
how  
[i]nvestments in knowledge have long-term capital qualities. 
Investments in activities—research, workshops, partnerships with 
academia—that build knowledge help ensure that the agency stays 
abreast of important developments in economic theory, empirical study, 
and legal analysis. Among other applications, this knowledge-building 
is a crucial element of effective case selection. A superior knowledge 
base increases the agency’s ability to attempt more complex and 
demanding matters, helps the agency ground its cases in the best 
possible conceptual and empirical foundations, and provides assurance 
                                                                                                                 
 
 282. ICN WORKING GROUP ON CARTELS, supra note 264, at 54 (recognizing that while the 
calculation method of optimal deterrence theory “is widely considered to be correct, there 
are some doubts as to its practicability (difficulties of calculation and proof) and some 
concerns about the companies’ rights being impaired if other criteria are completely 
disregarded in setting the fines”). 
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that the agency will not find itself trapped in the wrong analytical 
model.283 
Competition policy’s greatest failing has been its incomplete understanding of 
how competition works in particular markets in particular communities at particular 
time periods, and the interplay among private institutions, government institutions, 
and informal social, ethical, and moral norms. By undertaking more empirical 
research, competition authorities will understand better the competitive dynamics 
of particular markets and how legal and informal norms interact to influence 
individual behavior and competition generally. 
Competition authorities can use many interdisciplinary avenues to improve their 
understanding of market dynamics across different industries. This Article 
addresses two avenues: post-merger and post-conviction review.284 
1. Post-Merger Review 
To illustrate the benefits of post-merger review, we will use a merger between 
two nearby nonprofit hospitals in California’s Oakland-Alameda County region.285 
The state of California sought to enjoin this hospital merger under the federal 
antitrust laws. The geographic market definition was crucial.286 The district court 
was confronted with the issue of where patients could practicably turn for acute 
hospital inpatient services. If one defined the geographic market broadly, then one 
would assume that the merged hospitals would face stiff competition from over 
twenty hospitals in the San Francisco and East Bay areas. With conflicting 
economic expert testimony, the district court not surprisingly followed the 
approach by other courts that relied on the Elzinga-Hogarty economic analysis for 
defining the relevant geographic market. As the district court stated: 
[T]he first prong of the Elzinga-Hogarty test requires a determination of 
the merging hospitals’ “service area,” that area from which they attract 
their patients. In the second step, two measurements are taken of the 
flow of patients into and out of the test market. The Little In From 
Outside (“LIFO”) measurement calculates the percentage of patients 
who reside inside the test market that are admitted to those hospitals 
located within the test market. A LIFO of 100% would indicate that all 
hospital admittees who are residents of the test market are admitted to 
hospitals located within the test market. The Little Out From Inside 
(“LOFI”) measurement calculates the percentage of the test market’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 283. William E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good 
Performance?, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 903, 922 (2009). 
 284. See Stucke, supra note 68, at 579–91 (discussing in greater detail the need for such 
empirically driven research, its benefits, and several possible concerns of these proposals); 
Maurice E. Stucke, New Antitrust Realism, GCP: THE ONLINE MAGAZINE FOR GLOBAL 
COMPETITION POLICY, Jan. 2009, at 13–16. 
 285. California v. Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1130 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
 286. The parties agreed that the relevant product market was “the cluster of services 
comprising acute inpatient care,” including the services provided by Kaiser hospitals. Id. at 
1119. 
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hospitals’ patients who reside in the test market. A LOFI of 100% 
would indicate that all hospital patients admitted to hospitals in the test 
market are residents of the test market. A LIFO and LOFI of 75% is 
considered a weak indication of the existence of a market and a LIFO 
and LOFI of 90% is considered a strong indication of a market.287  
The plaintiff alleged an Inner East Bay geographic market. Plaintiff’s economic 
expert showed that eighty-five percent of all patients admitted to hospitals in the 
proposed Inner East Bay market resided in the Inner East Bay; the remaining 
fifteen percent of patients resided outside the Inner East Bay.288 Similarly, eighty-
five percent of patients who resided in the Inner East Bay were admitted to 
hospitals inside this area, while the remaining fifteen percent sought hospital 
treatment outside this area.289 The state of California argued that the eighty-five 
percent LIFO and LOFI results, along with its other evidence, were sufficient to 
prove geographic market.290 The district court disagreed. The state’s eighty-five 
percent results failed to meet “the preferred 90% threshold” of LIFO and LOFI 
calculations that represent “a strong showing that a market exists.”291 
The district court also believed that big buyers (namely the health plans), when 
faced with a price increase, had numerous mechanisms to discipline the hospitals. 
The merging parties’ hospitals were approximately two and a half miles apart.292 
The state of California argued that many patients, because of traffic and loyalty 
considerations to their doctors, would be unwilling to travel east through the 
Caldecott Tunnel and west across the Bay Bridge to these other hospitals.293 The 
court disagreed. The health plan providers could keep hospital prices low by 
“steering” patients to lower cost health care providers.294 Hospitals had high fixed 
costs in terms of the physical plant, equipment and maintaining a highly skilled 
staff, and consequently would be sensitive to such declines in patient volume.295 So 
if the hospitals post-merger tried to increase prices for acute inpatient care, then the 
rational profit-maximizing health plans would steer enough members away from 
the hospitals to defeat the exercise of market power.296 Indeed, the president and 
CEO of the second largest health plan in the East Bay downplayed the possibility 
of a price increase by the hospitals post-merger, in part due to health plans’ ability 
to steer patients to lower cost facilities.297 
The district court also expressed greater concern over the costs of false positives 
(more so than false negatives), fearing that “‘judicial intervention in a competitive 
                                                                                                                 
 
 287. Id. at 1120–21 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 288. Id. at 1121. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. at 1121–22. 
 291. Id. at 1123. 
 292.  Steven Tenn, The Price Effects of Hospital Mergers: A Case Study of the Sutter-
Summit Transaction 1 (FTC Bureau of Econ., Working Paper No. 293, 2008), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp293.pdf. 
 293.  Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. at 1126, 1130–31. 
 294.  Id. at 1130. 
 295.  Id.  
 296.  Id. at 1130–32. 
 297.  Id. 
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situation can itself upset the balance of market force, bringing about the very ills 
the antitrust laws were meant to prevent.’ This appears to have even more force in 
an industry, such as healthcare, experiencing significant and profound changes.”298 
(The court also held that defendants successfully established a failing company 
defense.)299 Accordingly, the district court permitted the merger to go through. 
So what happened post-merger? Did the merged hospital try to raise prices at 
one or both hospitals? If so, did the powerful health plans, as the defendants argued 
and as the health plan CEO and district court predicted, steer customers to the other 
Bay Area hospitals and defeat the exercise of market power? Often the antitrust 
agencies don’t know the answer to these questions. The competition agencies 
devote considerable resources investigating ex ante the merger. The agencies’ 
lawyers and economists work very hard to predict the merger’s likely competitive 
effects. But they often examine only half of the picture, namely the state of 
competition several years before the merger. Indeed, the antitrust agencies could 
simply abandon hospital mergers where the LIFO and LOFI figures fall below 
ninety percent or big buyers could steer patients to other hospitals. 
After the FTC, DOJ, and California’s Attorney General lost six straight hospital 
merger challenges in the 1990s, the FTC announced its Hospital Merger 
Retrospectives Project.300 To better understand hospital competition and the effects 
of hospital mergers and to update its prior assumptions about the consequences of 
particular transactions and the nature of competitive forces in health care, the FTC 
reviewed several consummated hospital mergers, including a retrospective study of 
the merger between the Bay Area hospitals.301 The FTC used detailed claims data 
from three large health insurers to compare the post-merger price change for the 
merging hospitals to a set of control group hospitals.  
So what happened post-merger? Not only did prices increase post-merger, but 
the price increase was among the largest of any comparable hospital in California. 
The merged entity significantly raised prices for one of the merging hospitals, 
between 23.2% and 50.4% relative to the control group.302 
                                                                                                                 
 
 298. Id. at 1137 (quoting FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1055 (8th Cir. 
1999)). 
 299. Id. at 1133–37. 
 300. See Deborah Haas-Wilson & Christopher Garmon, Two Hospital Mergers on 
Chicago’s North Shore: A Retrospective Study 2 (FTC Bureau of Econ., Working Paper No. 
294, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp294.pdf. 
 301. See Tenn, supra note 292; Aileen Thompson, The Effect of Hospital Mergers on 
Inpatient Prices: A Case Study of the New Hanover-Cape Fear Transaction (FTC Bureau of 
Econ., Working Paper No. 295, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/ 
wp295.pdf; see also Haas-Wilson & Garmon, supra note 300.  
 302. The price increase at the other hospital was not statistically different from the 
control group for any of the insurers. Tenn, supra note 292, at 20. One explanation Tenn 
provided for this asymmetry was  
that as a major provider of hospital services to commercial patients in the 
Oakland-Berkeley area, Alta Bates was a significant price constraint on 
Summit. However, Summit may have been less of a constraint on Alta Bates’ 
price since Summit was a relatively minor provider of hospital services to 
commercial patients.  
Id. at 22. 
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But the FTC’s findings raise larger unanswered questions: faced with this steep 
price increase, did the health plan providers try to steer patients to other hospitals? 
Did patients resist? As for the CEO who confidently predicted his company’s 
ability to defeat any price increase, what went wrong? 
Rather than continue to rely on empirically unsupported assumptions, now is the 
time for the antitrust agencies to review systematically what actually happens post-
merger. The agencies should institute specific mechanisms to test empirically the 
following key assumptions underlying the Horizontal Merger Guidelines: (i) 
anticompetitive effects are likely to occur only in highly concentrated (not 
moderately concentrated to unconcentrated) markets; (ii) even in highly 
concentrated markets, anticompetitive unilateral or coordinated effects are unlikely, 
absent certain economic conditions; (iii) anticompetitive effects are unlikely, absent 
high entry barriers; and (iv) many companies merge to generate significant 
efficiencies. 
First, the federal antitrust agencies should conduct a post-merger analysis of any 
merger subject to an extended Second Request review in which the agency: (i) took 
no enforcement action; (ii) permitted the merger in part to be consummated 
pursuant to a consent decree; or (iii) challenged the merger in court, but lost. The 
antitrust agency, two to five years after the merger was consummated, should 
examine the state of competition in that industry, including pricing levels and non-
price components such as innovation, productivity, services, and quality, to the 
extent observable, and test some of its predictions when it originally reviewed the 
merger.  
The agencies’ predictions and assumptions are often discussed in the agencies’ 
internal closing memoranda. When ending a merger investigation, the agencies 
typically discuss in the closing memorandum why the merger was unlikely to 
substantially lessen competition. The closing memorandum consequently offers 
testable predictions (such as whether an entrant or big buyer would defeat the 
exercise of market power or consumers would shift to another product or 
geographic area) for the subsequent post-merger review.  
To mitigate the burden on the agencies and market participants, the agencies can 
develop a two-stage post-merger review. In the first stage, the agency staff would 
conduct a quick-look review of competition in that industry. The staff would 
interview a small but representative sample of industry participants (for example, in 
a merger involving household consumer products, the staff would interview buyers 
from food, drug, and mass merchandiser retailers) about the status of competition 
and request from the merged entity a limited quantity of data, including relevant 
price data. If the quick-look review suggests that competition significantly 
diminished, the agencies would engage in a more in-depth review and analyze 
whether they had predicted correctly.  
The agency would report whether other variables, besides the merger, might 
explain the increase in prices or reduction in innovation, productivity, services, and 
quality. For those companies identified as potential entrants in the original merger 
review, the reviewing agency would analyze, based on its interviews with these 
identified entrants, why they chose not to enter, or if they did enter, why they were 
ineffectual. The reviewing agency would describe which, if any, of the merging 
parties’ efficiencies it could verify post-merger, the magnitude of the efficiencies, 
and the extent consumers directly benefited from such efficiencies.  
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The federal antitrust agencies would also summarize their findings for the 
public, and describe annually what specific actions, if any, they are undertaking 
with respect to this data, including how they are incorporating the findings from 
this data in their merger review. 
Second, the Obama administration should request, and Congress should provide, 
the DOJ with subpoena authority for non-public information to conduct such post-
merger review for its industries. The DOJ’s Antitrust Division appears to be more 
limited in conducting such general post-merger review. Its subpoena authority in 
civil investigations comes from the Antitrust Civil Process Act,303 which limits an 
antitrust investigation to premerger activities or suspected antitrust violations.304 
The FTC, in contrast, has broader statutory authority to gather information on the 
effects of its enforcement measures.305 This subpoena authority should be 
sufficiently broad to enable the DOJ to test (and eliminate) other explanations as to 
why competition (which includes important parameters beyond price) increased or 
diminished post-merger. The federal antitrust agencies should also coordinate with 
other federal agencies in sharing such information, subject to the data producer’s 
ability to challenge the dissemination of its commercially sensitive information. 
Third, any publicly held company that seeks to rely on an efficiency defense 
before the antitrust agencies and/or the courts should be required to publicly report 
its claimed efficiencies in its filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission. (If such disclosure would divulge a trade secret or other confidential 
research, development, or commercial information that would be ordinarily 
protected from public disclosure under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), then the antitrust 
agencies may excuse the public disclosure of such information.) For each year post-
merger (for the period that it claims the efficiencies will be realized), the company 
should report the actual amount of efficiencies realized versus the projected 
amount. This should temper the company executives from inflating the claimed 
efficiencies, and hold them accountable to the shareholders for pursuing a growth-
by-acquisition strategy, while informing the agencies on those efficiencies for 
particular industries that are more likely to be cognizable and substantial.  
The FTC’s recent hospital merger retrospectives have been very helpful. But 
there does not exist today a built-in mechanism for routine post-merger review 
across agencies. Empirically testing and refining the neoclassical economic theories 
underlying much of the Merger Guidelines have several benefits. Such empirical 
work promotes effective learning by creating feedback about the relation between 
the situational conditions and the appropriate response. By instituting a regular and 
systematic review of close-call mergers, the agencies reduce the likelihood of false 
negatives and positives in merger review, promote more effective antitrust 
enforcement, increase transparency of the merger review process, and make 
themselves more accountable for their decisions. An empirically driven 
competition policy may also temper the claims, which have also increased over the 
past quarter century, of partisanship in antitrust enforcement. 
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2. Post-Conviction Review 
To better understand why executives engage in price-fixing and to advance the 
empirical research on coordinated effects, the agencies should report, two to five 
years after prosecuting a cartel, the state of competition in that industry, as 
described above. With criminal cartel prosecutions, the DOJ typically seeks fines 
and incarceration. Whether these measures were sufficient to restore competition 
and deter recidivism should be assessed.  
After securing its criminal convictions, the DOJ by itself or through a pilot 
program with social scientists should interview the price-fixers and publicly report 
the following: How were the cartels (including those with many members) formed 
and enforced? Did they act as many profit-maximizer game theories predict, or 
were they more trusting and cooperative than these theories’ predicted 
outcomes?306 If so, why? As the number of conspirators increased, were there other 
specific factors that enabled them to collude? Why did certain companies 
repeatedly violate the antitrust laws? What steps did the company take after its 
earlier conviction to increase antitrust compliance, and why were they 
unsuccessful? 
The DOJ also should make available a computerized database identifying all 
civil and criminal antitrust consent decrees, pleas, or litigated actions involving 
cartel activity under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The database should include 
certain industry characteristics, such as: (i) the number of conspirators (and best 
estimate of their market shares); (ii) the length of conspiracy; (iii) the product or 
services market in which collusion occurred; (iv) the number of competitors (and 
their market share) who were not formerly alleged to be part of the conspiracy; (v) 
the number of entrants (and their market shares) during the period of the 
conspiracy; and (vi) the nature of the conspiracy.307 This data can help those in 
academia, private practice, and the antitrust agencies to better understand collusion 
and further develop screening mechanisms to identify industries more susceptible 
to collusion.308 
One cannot assume that such empirical testing and learning will arise 
independently within competition policy. The Supreme Court and lower courts 
cannot undertake such empirical testing, as their view is limited to the evidence the 
parties supply. Nor can academia and the private bar fulfill this mission. Compiling 
such data can often be costly, and the data may be nonpublic. In undertaking this 
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empirical testing and learning, the competition authorities can enrich the 
marketplace of ideas. The data lowers the search costs for academics and increases 
transparency. 
B. Possibilities for Incorporating Behavioral Economics into  
Existing Antitrust Doctrine 
Besides the empirical evidence needed to improve the predictive capabilities of 
antitrust’s economic theories, is there a role for behavioral economics to play in 
antitrust analysis? Even with further empirical work, behavioral economics may not 
ultimately supply a single organizing principle. It is unlikely that behavioral 
economics will yield a single concentration measure (like the HHI) to predict 
which mergers may substantially lessen competition. Nor will behavioral 
economics offer a rule at a broad level of generality that dictates when unilateral 
conduct crosses the debated lines from beneficial to benign to anticompetitive. 
But this is no reason to ignore the behavioral economics literature. Life is 
messier than the Chicago School’s unifying vision of self-correcting markets filled 
with rational profit-maximizing agents that pursue their economic self-interest. 
Relying on market fundamentalism only will lead to future market crises and 
government bailouts. Along the way to the next financial crisis, there will be cases 
where the Chicago School’s rigid assumptions (which, in turn, supply the model’s 
predictive capabilities) fail to explain or predict the market behavior. Behavioral 
economics can better explain behavior that the Chicago School ignores or 
marginalizes. 
So even without additional empirical work, behavioral economics may play a 
role in the agencies’ analysis in (i) instructing the courts and agencies to reevaluate 
hard cases where, on the one hand, neoclassical analysis suggests that the conduct 
is not or should not be anticompetitive, but sufficient evidence suggests the 
contrary; (ii) informing the competition agencies whether they are indeed fulfilling 
their mission; and (iii) providing insights into possible applications of section 5 of 
the FTC Act. 
1. Use of “Real World” Evidence That Is Not Explainable  
by Neoclassical Economic Theory 
At times neoclassical economic theory cannot easily be reconciled with 
evidence of the parties’ behavior, intent, motives, or post-merger plans.309 In some 
instances, economic theory suggests an oligopoly’s ability to tacitly collude (for 
example, to successfully implement a predatory pricing scheme) is impossible, 
despite the evidence of anticompetitive intent and the fact that the companies for 
forty to fifty years were able to raise prices twice annually like clockwork.310  
                                                                                                                 
 
 309. See Leslie, supra note 33, at 318–38 (discussing evidence of antitrust violations, 
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In other instances, the Chicago School’s economic theories suggest that, absent 
interbrand market power, a manufacturer cannot raise the price for its aftermarket 
parts or services. Rational consumers considering the purchase of the equipment 
“will inevitably factor into [their] purchasing decision the expected cost of 
aftermarket support.”311 As the Court’s Kodak decision reflects, economic theory 
may be inconsistent with economic reality, with evidence of increased prices and 
excluded competition.312 The Chicago School’s beliefs, some skeptics may say, 
were raised in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Kodak. But it is questionable whether the 
current Court would reach the same outcome in Kodak, especially if they, like 
Professor Hovenkamp and Justice Scalia, “believe that markets generally work well 
when left alone, [and] intervention is justified only in the relatively few cases 
where the judiciary can fix the problem more reliably, more cheaply, or more 
quickly than the market can fix itself.”313 
Chairman Leibowitz’s and Commissioner Rosch’s concurring statements in the 
Ovation case314 provide another illustration of the extent to which documents 
reflecting the parties’ intentions and incentives can affect merger analysis.315 
Ovation Pharmaceuticals, Inc. acquired two drugs to treat patent ductus 
arteriosus (PDA), a serious congenital heart defect in newborns. First, Ovation 
acquired from Merck the drug Indocin.316 Several months later, Ovation acquired 
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from Abbott Laboratories the U.S. rights to the drug NeoProfen.317 After acquiring 
NeoProfen, Ovation raised the price it charged hospitals for Indocin by nearly 1300 
percent.318 In December 2008, the FTC challenged under section 7 of the Clayton 
Act Ovation’s acquisition of NeoProfen as a merger to monopoly in a market for 
drugs used to treat PDA.319 Although Commissioner Rosch voted in favor of the 
section 7 challenge, he argued in his concurrence that Ovation’s earlier acquisition 
of Indocin was also subject to challenge under section 7.320  
Here again the actual evidence is hard to reconcile with the Chicago School’s 
neoclassical economic theories. Specifically, Indocin for many years was the only 
FDA-approved pharmaceutical treatment for PDA.321 Given Indocin’s market 
position, Merck (its original owner) could have charged a monopoly price for its 
drug. Indeed, under the Court’s dicta in Trinko, Merck’s charging a monopoly price 
would serve “an important element of the free-market system,” in that monopoly 
pricing serves as an inducement to “attract[] ‘business acumen’ in the first place” 
and engage in “risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth.”322 
So one is left with two monopolists, each presumably a rational profit 
maximizer, choosing dramatically different pricing policies for a patented drug. 
Why didn’t Merck, a large sophisticated company, sell Indocin at the monopoly 
price (under thirty dollars per vial at the time of the acquisition)? Perhaps 
reputational effects, said Commissioner Rosch. If Merck sold a product used to 
treat premature babies at a monopoly price, “that could damage its reputation and 
its sales of those more profitable products.”323 It could also be that ethics and 
conscience had an impact on Merck’s pricing decision. But in a world of rational 
profit maximizers, consumers would applaud, not condemn, Merck. Charging 
parents whose babies were born with this potentially life-threatening congenital 
heart defect the monopoly price would signal others to invest in such innovative 
drugs. Instead, reality suggests that consumers and Chicago School economists 
differ at times in their perception of what is fair.324  
But, in Commissioner Rosch’s view, that dynamic changed when Ovation 
acquired Indocin from Merck. Commissioner Rosch found “reason to believe that 
the sale of Indocin to Ovation had the effect of eliminating the reputational 
constraints on Merck that had existed prior to the sale.”325 Specifically, Ovation 
lacked Merck’s “large product portfolio,” so Ovation “arguably was not concerned, 
as Merck had been, that the sale of Indocin at a monopoly price would damage its 
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reputation and sales of more profitable products.”326 Thus, Commissioner Rosch 
reasoned that, because Merck did not charge a monopoly price for its drug used to 
treat premature babies, Merck “arguably would not have the incentive to acquire 
another treatment that might prevent it from pricing Indocin at a monopoly 
price.”327 Because there was evidence that the transaction substituted “Ovation, a 
firm that had an incentive to protect its ability to engage in monopoly pricing, for 
Merck, which lacked the same incentive” and that “Merck had no incentive to 
acquire NeoProfen, but Ovation had an incentive to do so in order to maintain its 
monopoly pricing in the PDA market,” Commissioner Rosch, joined by Chairman 
Leibowitz, stated that he would have challenged Ovation’s first acquisition as 
well.328 A district court judge has since dismissed the FTC’s and Minnesota’s 
claims on the grounds of market definition, and the case is now before the Eighth 
Circuit.329 
More generally, it may be the case that behavioral economics finds its best fit in 
merger review, which is perhaps the closest antitrust enforcers come to engaging in 
a traditional regulatory process.330 The expert agencies rely on a routine (including 
the presumptions discussed in Part III) to winnow their review of thousands of 
merger filings to a small percentage. For these mergers, the agencies engage in 
highly fact-specific inquiries; their conclusions in the form of closing statements 
and/or a consent decree are case specific and do not constitute binding precedent; 
and the review of the proposed merger is done ex ante rather than ex post.  
The merger review process offers the agencies the benefit of an extensive factual 
record, including investigational submissions of the parties, interviews with 
customers and competitors, and the parties’ documents. At times, neoclassical 
theory cannot explain the evidence of the merging parties’ behavior, intent, 
motives, or post-merger plans. In this vein, the recent changes to the Merger 
Guidelines open the door for greater consideration of “direct evidence” of the type 
that Chairman Leibowitz and Commissioner Rosch credited in Ovation. The 
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revised Merger Guidelines, for example, explain that merger review is a “fact-
specific process through which the Agencies . . . apply a range of analytical tools to 
the reasonably available and reliable evidence to evaluate competitive concerns”331 
and will evaluate “several categories and sources of evidence,”332 including the 
parties’ documents and testimony.333 And unlike the prior Guidelines, the revised 
Merger Guidelines enumerate several categories of such direct evidence.  
The fact that the Guidelines now explicitly recognize that such evidence is 
entitled to weight on par with economic modeling may provide both the agencies, 
as well as the parties, with a structure for evaluating evidence in light of the 
insights that behavioral economics offers. As Commissioner Rosch has observed, 
this, in turn, could allow the agencies to more carefully scrutinize the close cases 
that neoclassical thinking predicts should be procompetitive or competitively 
neutral, but where actual evidence of how the firms do and will behave show 
otherwise.334 Behavioral economics thus can fill in the analysis and explain the 
real-world evidence when neoclassical economic theory cannot. 
2. A Better-Informed Competition Advocate 
The federal antitrust agencies are well suited to consider how the behavioral 
economics literature can inform antitrust analysis.  
First, at a macro institutional level, the agencies can draw on the behavioral 
insights they have gained outside of federal civil antitrust law to better inform their 
competition missions. To this end, the DOJ can use its expertise in prosecuting 
white-collar crimes generally (and price-fixing conspiracies in particular) to inquire 
why executives, with so much to lose, fix prices, and why cartels are more durable 
and their members more trustful than neoclassical economic theory predicts.  
Similarly, the FTC can marry insights gained from its Bureau of Consumer 
Protection about the types of conduct that are likely to deceive consumers, with 
insights from its Bureau of Economics about when such deception harms 
competition (as opposed to individual harm that does not significantly impair 
competition). The alleged competitive harm in several recent Commission cases—
N-Data,335 Rambus,336 and Intel337—was premised, in part, on deception. More 
generally, the FTC can explore ways that it can bring its consumer protection 
mission in line with a goal of creating and preserving consumer choice (as opposed 
to narrowly focusing on seller behavior through mandated disclosures or antifraud 
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laws).338 A goal of protecting consumer choice requires enacting policies that, from 
the consumer’s perspective, remove barriers to optimal decision making; removing 
those barriers, in turn, depends on analyzing how consumers make decisions in the 
first place. Moreover, a focus on consumer choice is broad enough to encompass 
the insights from the FTC’s ongoing studies into behavioral economics, but not so 
broad as to necessarily displace the neoclassical emphasis on providing consumers 
with full decision-making authority. 
Second, the FTC and DOJ have developed substantive areas of expertise in 
certain complex and important industries, including defense, media, healthcare, 
petroleum, and pharmaceuticals. At times, the agencies will observe behavior in 
these industries that often leads to anticompetitive effects—even though rational 
choice theory may predict otherwise. The agencies can challenge these practices as 
presumptively illegal under a truncated rule-of-reason/“inherently suspect” 
analysis.339 The FTC, in particular, has recently signaled an interest in applying the 
“inherently suspect” test to specific practices.340 This framework would reduce the 
cost of error under the Court’s per se rule, without imposing the high litigation 
costs and risk of false positives and negatives under the rule of reason.341  
Third, from a procedural standpoint, the DOJ and FTC also have the benefit of 
an extensive investigational process that allows them to evaluate on the basis of the 
parties’ documents, investigational hearings, and economic analysis, whether and 
to what extent harm to competition is occurring. In post-merger reviews, for 
example, the agencies can investigate whether rational profit maximizers did 
indeed enter the markets (and if not why not). Private antitrust plaintiffs typically 
do not possess such extensive information, which at times is non-public and costly 
to collect. Moreover, when it so chooses, the FTC can pursue administrative 
litigation and issue a ruling in the first instance that not only has the force of law 
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(subject to federal appellate review), but also provides a roadmap for federal 
appellate courts to consider in their review.  
Fourth, from a policy standpoint, the DOJ and FTC can regularly assess whether 
the agency remedies are indeed effective—a process that the FTC has engaged with 
on both the antitrust342 and consumer protection sides.343 Other agencies at times 
seek to promulgate rules to protect the consumer that are anticompetitive. At times, 
firms compete to exploit or help bounded rational consumers. Distinguishing 
between the two can be challenging. So the federal antitrust agencies, by 
understanding behavioral economics, can better understand when firms are 
providing consumers commitment devices to deal with their bounded willpower 
(Christmas savings club accounts, for example) or competing in better ways to 
simply exploit them. Antitrust authorities can offer a more nuanced and powerful 
message that accounts for consumers’ interest and protects competition than overly 
simplistic assumptions that “big is bad,” or that humans behave as rational self-
interested consumers with perfect willpower. 
3. Providing Insights into Possible Applications of Section 5 of the FTC Act 
Behavioral economics can inform the FTC’s application of its section 5 
authority, which prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition” and “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices.”344 Although the FTC routinely uses its section 5 
authority in the consumer protection context, it has also applied its stand-alone 
section 5 authority in the antitrust context345 (although the scope of the FTC’s 
section 5 authority in that context remains the subject of much debate). 
In FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., the Supreme Court stated that section 5 
empowers the FTC to “define and proscribe an unfair competitive practice, even 
though the practice does not infringe either the letter or the spirit of the antitrust 
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laws” and to “proscribe practices as unfair or deceptive in their effect upon 
consumers.”346 Besides this broad statement, the Court has provided little guidance 
on section 5’s scope or application. Congress amended the FTC Act in 1994 to 
incorporate the consumer injury test, which the FTC had earlier adopted.347 
Although the codification provided guidance on what is unfair, the Commission, 
academics, and practitioners are still sorting through what types of conduct section 
5 might cover.348 
In the context of those debates, three of the current Federal Trade 
Commissioners have observed that, because the Supreme Court has contracted the 
reach of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, using section 5 of the FTC Act might 
be justified in those cases where anticompetitive conduct is occurring, but where 
the current antitrust doctrine does not supply a cause of action.349 The FTC is 
uniquely positioned to draw on the behavioral economics literature in these 
circumstances. As Susan Creighton, former FTC Commissioner Tom Leary, and 
others have suggested, “[p]erhaps the least controversial application of a stand-
alone Section 5 claim should be its use in ‘frontier’ settings, where it is as an 
avenue for redressing anticompetitive acts or practices that have newly emerged 
and have not yet been fully absorbed into the fabric of the Sherman or Clayton 
acts.”350 In these cases, the behavioral economics literature may better explain than 
neoclassical theory why harm is occurring. So rather than try to jam a square peg 
(the evidence of anticompetitive effects and purpose) in the round hole (the current 
neoclassical economic theory underpinning the Clayton and Sherman Acts case 
law), section 5 may provide a more logical home for initially bringing such frontier 
cases.  
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Behavioral economics, of course, does not arm an antitrust enforcer or court 
with unfettered discretion. Any governmental action must be sufficiently 
predictable, objective, and transparent under rule-of-law principles. When the FTC 
relies on behavioral economics in the context of section 5, several safeguards are 
already in place. First, the FTC lacks authority to impose criminal penalties, seek 
treble monetary damages or obtain retrospective relief under section 5. Second, 
private plaintiffs cannot bring in federal court follow-on treble damage class 
actions for section 5 violations.351 Third, the FTC’s decisions are subject to review 
by the federal appellate court of the respondent’s choosing, as well as the Supreme 
Court. Indeed, when the Commission last used section 5 in the early 1980s, its 
findings of liability were struck down in a trio of federal appellate decisions, which 
found, among other things, that the Commission failed to establish predictable rules 
and legally cognizable anticompetitive effects.352 By all indications, the Roberts 
Court will impose these same requirements.353 
But as an added safeguard for novel cases, the FTC should use behavioral 
economics to explain strong evidence of both anticompetitive purpose and effects. 
If corporate executives engage in conduct with the purpose and actual effect of 
harming competition, then it makes little sense to immunize such anticompetitive 
conduct because it is unexplainable under the Chicago School’s neoclassical 
economic theories.  
CONCLUSION 
Competition policy is entering a new age. Interest in antitrust law has increased 
worldwide, and the United States no longer holds a monopoly on competition 
policy. The question for competition authorities is whether and to what extent do 
bounded rationality, self-interest, and willpower matter. 
Courts and agencies will continue to rely on the assumption of rational, self-
interested profit maximizers with perfect willpower, which has become so 
embedded in antitrust policy, to predict or explain anticompetitive harm. But 
reliance on these rational-choice theories will recede in the coming years as they 
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fail to explain actual market behavior. Here, the behavioral economics literature 
and other interdisciplinary economic theories will advance competition policy in 
understanding such behavior. 
Business marketing executives have long understood behavioral economics. 
Next came the behavioral economists and legal scholars, and now antitrust lawyers 
and policy makers are starting to study behavioral economics. The Supreme 
Court’s economic thinking, as reflected in Trinko and Leegin, still lags. But 
behavioral antitrust is no longer on the horizon. 
Behavioral economics is not a celebration of our shortcomings. Putting aside 
self-interest, which is not accepted as a desirable norm, we will continually strive 
toward improving our cognitive abilities and willpower. Perhaps one day, society 
may evolve in terms of rationality and willpower to more closely mirror the 
Chicago School model. In the Paradiso, Dante described the light in the form of a 
river pouring its splendour on the banks. But as Beatrice explained, “The river and 
the topazes that pass into it and out and the laughter of the flowers are shadowy 
forecasts of their truth; not that these things are imperfect in themselves, but the 
defect is in thyself, that thy vision is not yet so exalted.”354 In understanding better 
how we err, we perhaps can find ways to improve ourselves and the way we 
interact with others and, in doing so, instill rules of law that more accurately reflect 
this enhanced understanding. 
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